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SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE CORPORATION IN
AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN: THE POTENTIAL FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Christine Parker* and Leon Wolff*
INTRODUCTION
Corporations are undergoing a subtle transformation. Usually regarded as investment
vehicles for shareholders, corporations are now assuming an additional identity-as
entities which share responsibility for upholding human rights.2 This new identity
does not sit comfortably with conventional wisdom on corporate governance.
Traditional corporate governance theory, based on nineteenth century notions of trust,
posits that 'the company' is a legal entity embodying the members from time to time.3
Directors, as trustees of corporate assets, owe duties to foster the interests of the
shareholders by maximising their investments. 4 Under this view, directors do not owe
wider obligations to society.
This traditional understanding, however, is beginning to yield to more recent legal
and social pressures. Legal developments in regulatory practice, in combination with
an upsurge in social movement activism, is now forcing corporations to accept that
they are more than mere economic entities. 5 They are also private 'governments '6-
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1 M Friedman, "A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits" New York Times 13 September 1970 at 32. M Friedman, Capitaisin and Freedom (1962)
at 133.
2 B Frey, "The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the
Protection of International Human Rights" (1997) 7 MinnJGlobal Trade 153.
3 I Trethowan, "Director's Personal Liability to Creditors for Company Debts" (1992) 20 ABLJ
41 at 43.
4 Ibid at 41.
5 Neo-institutionalism in economics also sees the corporation as more than an economic
entity. For an economic theory of the corporation that also sees the corporation as a
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social and political entities with the ability to exercise general powers over themselves
and, more importantly, over others. 7 As Selznick points out, "management and
governance coexist and interact. An organization that tries to be instrumentally single-
minded, guided wholly by norms of purposive rationality, nonetheless finds itself
faced with more comprehensive obligations. ' 8 Corporations are increasingly
acknowledging these broader social responsibilities9 (including those relating to
human rights).
But should corporations play a part in upholding human rights? And, if so, how can
corporations be effective in this role? In this article, we apply a comparative lens to
answer these questions. We focus on one area of human rights-the right to work in a
workplace free of sexual harassment-and contrast the experiences of Australian and
Japanese corporations in assuming responsibility for sexual harassment. By so doing,
we aim to identify the conditions in which corporate governance might be an effective
way of advancing human rights within the corporation.
Our choice of case study is deliberate. To work in an environment free of sexual
harassment is an inviolable human right.' 0 The Vienna Declaration prepared by the
1993 World Conference on Human Rights'i made this clear when it characterised
sexual harassment as a human rights violation "incompatible with the dignity and
worth of the human person". 12 Similar reasoning is entrenched in most modern legal
systems. In Australia, for example, sexual harassment is specified as sex
discrimination; 13 in Japan, sexual harassment is regarded as an unlawful interference
with the "personal rights" of women.14
political entity, see the team production theory of M Blair and L Stout, "A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law" (1999) The Journal of Corporate Law 751.
6 For example, A Jay, Management and Machiavelli: Power and Authority in Business Life (1987);
R Dahl, "A Prelude to Corporate Reform" (1972) Business and Society Review 17; J Parkinson,
Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the 7heory of Company Law (1993).
7 Sometimes corporations can exercise power over people who did not even choose to enter
into a contractual (or property) relationship with the company or had little bargaining
power in doing so.
8 P Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth (1992) at 291.
9 Since the 1960s, academics have debated the social responsibility of corporations. Y Miwa,
"Corporate Social Responsibility: Dangerous and Harmful, Though Maybe Not Irrelevant"
(1999) 84 Cornell L Rev 1227. This debate continues today. See "Symposium Transcript:
Corporate Social Responsibility: Paradigm or Paradox?" (1999) 84 CornellL Rev 1282.
10 The right to work or study in an environment free of sexual harassment is usually regarded
as part of the human rights of women. See E Defeis, "The Role of International Law in the
Twenty-First Century: Women's Human Rights: The Twenty First Century" (1995) 18
Fordhamn Int'l L] 1748 at 1748-9. The main reason sexual harassment is regarded as an abuse
of the human rights of women is that an overwhehning majority of victims are women. For
the situation in Japan, for example, see A Okuyama, Shokuba ni Okeru Sekushuaru
liarasumento [Sexual H1arassment in the Workplace] (1999) at 9-13.
11 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993 World Conference on Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993) at pt 1, para. 18.
12 E Defeis, above n 10 at 1748-9.
13 J Morgan, "Sexual Harassment and the Public/Private Dichotomy: Equality, Morality and
Mariners" in M Thornton (ed), Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (1995) 89 at 91.
14 See, for example, the Fukuoka Sexual Harassment case, Judgment of 16 April 1992, Fukuoka
District Court, (1992) 783 Hanrei Taimuzu 60.
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Our approach to our case study, however, is unusual. Although our approach is
apparently comparative (in the sense that we seek to contrast the regulatory responses
to sexual harassment in Australia and Japan), our article is not 'classic15 comparative
law. True comparative law, Reitz asserts, "involves explicit comparison of aspects of
two or more legal systems". 16 In this article, however, our aim is to develop-and test
-a model for the successful corporate governance of human rights. We use the
available data on Australian and Japanese sexual harassment law and practice to this
end. Our method, therefore, is not to compare the different regulatory regimes in
Australia and Japan with each othe; but rather with our working model of corporate
governance. To the extent that this approach confuses, irritates or offends traditional
comparativists, we make no apologies. Our own 'spin' on comparative methodology
helps us in our objective to advance corporate governance theory. By utilising the
experiences of both Australian and Japanese corporations, we believe we can provide a
more nuanced picture of the possibilities and pitfalls in entrusting corporations with
human rights issues.
Thus, we will show that, in Australia, a combination of sexual harassment law and
publicity about breaches of the law appears to have achieved some modest success in
giving anti-discrimination rights an impact on corporate governments. This serves as a
useful starting point from which to develop a working model on the effective intra-
corporate management of sexual harassment. However, when we apply this model to
the position in Japan, we observe some disadvantages to relying on corporate
governance to regulate sexual harassment. This leads us to the view that corporate
governance of sexual harassment issues specifically (and of human rights issues more
generally) is possible-but only if there is strong public consciousness of the existence
of the relevant right, an influential and ongoing social movement supporting it, and a
strong legal regime holding individuals and companies accountable for breaches.
In the first part of this article, we explore the legal and social undercurrents in
Australia and Japan which are encouraging corporations to embrace broader social
responsibilities. We trace the divergent paths that Australian and Japanese companies
and their management are taking towards a new culture of 'corporate citizenship'.' 7 In
the second part, we turn to our case study -----sexual harassment ----and its regulation
within Australian corporations. We note how large Australian companies have
adopted sexual harassment policies with some modest successes, and uncover the legal
and social conditions that have led to these results. By combining this with scholarly
research and theory on business regulation, we propose a model for determining when
corporate governance of sexual harassment is likely to be effective. In the third part,
we test this model by reference to the experience of sexual harassment in Japan, a
1 What amounts to comparative law is a debate with widely divergent views. As Demleitner
correctly observes, there is an "apparent lack of a common core or a common purpose of
comparative law". N Demleitner, "Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in
Comparative Law" (1998) 46 AmJCornpL 647 at 651.
16 J Reitz, "How to Do Comparative Law" (1998) 46 AmJ Comp L 617 at 618. As Reitz observes,
this apparently obvious statement is not without controversy. Some, for example, argue
that comparative law may also be "implicitly" comparative. See D Foote, "The Roles of
Comparative Law" (1999) 73 Wash L Rev 25 at 26.
17 In Japan, 'corporate citizenship' has entered the Japanese language as the foreign loan
expression c5por~to shichizunshippu. See Jiyfa Kokuminsha (ed), 1992 Nenhan no Gendai Yago
no Kiso Chishiki [Basic Facts about Contemporary Terms (1992 Edition)] (1992) at 1198.
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country of which it is often thought that the culture/institutions of authority are often
too quick to resolvepotential disputes 'consensually' before they have a chance to enter
the public sphere.' 8 In the final section, we draw some conclusions about what the
experience of corporate implementation of management of sexual harassment might
mean for other areas of human rights.
1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RECENT
TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN
In the 1990s, two trends are encouraging directors and top managers to see, at least
tentatively, that corporate social responsibilities are part of their corporate governance
obligations: (1) formal legal techniques for making senior managers and directors
accountable for failures; and (2) public scrutiny and social movement activism,
Legal techniques
The legal path to incorporating social responsibilities into the duties of corporate
management relies on two legal techniques. The first is a generally increased emphasis
on broader corporate governance responsibilities. In the A WA case, the Supreme Court
of New South Wales found that both the CEO and non-executive directors of a
company could be found negligent for failing to ensure adequate internal controls
were put in place to protect against losses due to foreign exchange dealings.' 9 The case
made it very clear that directors are individually responsible, not just for setting broad
policy, but also for taking an active interest in ensuring adequate corporate governance
systems to bring the company into compliance with policy. In theory, at least, this
decision leaves the way open for directors to be held personally responsible for
corporate failures that result in breaches of a variety of laws and regulations (including
those that explicitly or implicitly protect human rights such as health and safety
regulation and anti-discrimination regulation). 20 Certainly, the anecdotal evidence is
strong that many directors and senior managers are now very concerned to ensure
they have more detailed internal control and compliance systems in place to make sure
they are meeting the requirements of not only the Australian Corporations Law but
also the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and other regulations.
1 There is some quantitative empirical evidence to support this. For example, see J Sanders,
V L Hamilton and T Yuasa, "The Institutionalization of Sanctions for Wrongdoing Inside
Organizations: Public Judgments in Japan, Russia and the United States" (1998) 32(4) L &
Soc'y Rev 871, who find that Tokyo-based respondents to a survey about appropriate
sanctions for organizational wrongdoing more often suggested restorative sanctions should
be applied to the organization (eg, an apology) than did Russian and US respondents.
19 Daniels & Ors vAWA (1995) 13 ACLC 614. AWA decided to hedge against foreign currency
fluctuations by forward purchases of foreign currency against contracts for imported
goods. The company lost over $49 million, although the accounts appeared to show they
had made a substantial profit. The company's management had relied on one person to
control the dealing, and on the external auditors to check what went on. The management
failed to set up an adequate system of internal control and record keeping, and did not act
upon the failures in internal controls that were brought to its attention by the auditors.
20 This is a line of reasoning that the Delaware Court of Chancery has taken in thie influential
case of In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation. 698 A 2d 959 (1996). See J Hill,
"Deconstructing Sunbeam -- Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance" (1999) 17
C&SLJ 288.
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In Japan, the legal mechanism for broadening directors' duties lies in Article 266-321
of the Commercial Code. 22 This article provides that directors are personally liable to
third parties for losses sustained as a result of intentional or grossly negligent
dereliction of duties. In the 1969 case of Muta v Izuo Kakai KK,23 the Supreme Court
held that article 266-3 was a special provision designed to protect third parties
(especially creditors) and that it operated in addition to, not in combination, with any
civil law tort requirements. 24 Third parties could seek compensation under article 266-
3 for their losses, whether directly or indirectly caused. In seeking damages, third
parties need only prove that the directors exercised bad faith or gross negligence when
performing their duties to the company, it is unnecessary to establish any further
illegality in the more immediate relationship between the third party and the director.
The voluminous25 case law on article 255-3 has focused on balancing directors
responsibilities to protect third parties with their broader discretion to take business
risks.26 However, at least in theory, the courts would not allow a discretion to act if a
business decision amounted to a violation of a law or the Articles of Incorporation.27 In
such a case, an injured third party could invoke article 266-3 to seek compensation
directly from the directors. This possibility throws open personal liability for directors
of Japanese companies if a breach of a law or regulation-including those relating to
anti-discrimination, environmental management and product safety ----results in losses.
Following the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s and the banking crisis
in the mid to late 1990s, 8 many corporations are becoming increasingly sensitive to
such a risk.2 9 As a result, since about 1998, a number of Japanese corporations and
financial institutions have begun establishing internal compliance policies and systems
to meet their responsibilities under the Civil Code, Commercial Code, banking and
finance laws, environmental statutes and labour legislation. 30
The second legal technique by which directors and managers are being held
accountable for social responsibilities is via strict vicarious liability for regulatory
offences coupled with the availability of 'due diligence' defences or damages discounts
21 See generally R W Dziubla, "Enforcing Corporate Responsibility: Japanese Corporate
Directors' Liability to Third Parties for Failure to Supervise" (1986) 18 LawinJapan 55.
22 Law No. 48 of 1899.
23 Judgment of 26 November 1969, Supreme Court, (1969) 23 Minshi- 2150.
24 Article 709 of the Civil Code provides for tort liability for negligence. The Supreme Court
in Mut6's case held that Article 266-3 of the Commercial Code is not to be interpreted
subject to article 709 of the Civil Code.
25 H Nakaso, "Hiratorishimariyaku no Daisansha ni taisuru Sekinin" ["Liability of Ordinary
Directors to Third Parties"] (1986) 582 Hanrei Taimuzu 17.
26 Y Goto, 'Torishimariyaku ni Akui mata wa Judai na Kashitsu ni yoru Ninmu Ketai ga
nakatta toshite Shoho Ni Ni Rokujo no Sari Dai Ikko no Sekinin ga Hlitei Sareta Jirei" ["A
Case Rejecting Directors' Liability under Article 266-3(1) of the Commercial Code for
Intentional or Grossly Negligent Breach of Duties"] (1988) 41(1) Hcritsu noHiroba 73 at 77.
27 K Kanzaki, "'Torishimariyaku no Choi Gimu ["Directors' Duty of Carel] (1980) 82(6)
Minsh5h5 Zasshi 719.
28 See ) H4 Whittaker and Y Kurosawa, "Japan's Crisis: Evolution and Implications" (1998) 22
Cambridge J Econ 761.
29 S Nomura, "Kawaru Nihon no Kaisha-Naibu Tosei to Konpuraiansu" (Horei Junshu
Bumon)" I"The Changing Face of the Japanese Corporation-Internal Governance and
Legal Compliance" I (1999) 537 FMgaku Semin 44.
30 Ibid.
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for having in place a system to prevent breaches. 3 1 Due diligence defences allow
directors and top management to escape personal liability for a regulatory offence
committed by an agent of the corporation if they can show they had in place an
effective internal control or compliance system to prevent the breach occurring.
'Due diligence' type defences abound in Australian law. For example, many pieces
of environmental legislation deem directors and managers directly liable for high
financial penalties or even prison sentences if the company is found guilty of
environmental offences, unless they can prove that a defence such as due diligence
applies.32 Similarly, in trade practices regulation, the courts will discount the damages
payable by the company and top managers where an effective compliance system is in
place. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission regularly negotiates
settlements and/or damages on this basis. 33 In anti-discrimination regulation, top
managers cannot be made personally liable unless they were personally involved in
the incident. However, the company can be made vicariously liable, in which case they
may invoke due diligence defences either in formal court proceedings or in informal
negotiations with anti-discrimination regulators. 34
In Japan, by contrast, the concept of 'due diligence' has yet to be entrenched in
legislation, but its potential is currently of great interest to legal scholars. For example,
some scholars forecast that Japanese corporate governance law will soon move in the
direction taken by United States law 35 and embrace 'due diligence' as the tool for
testing directors' liability for regulatory breaches.3 6 Others predict developments in
Japanese vicarious liability law. 7 In form, this law provides corporations immunity
from liability for the transgressions of employees if they take sufficient care assigning
and supervising employees; in practice, however, no Japanese court in the postwar era
has ever granted this exemption. 38 This may possibly change with the advent of
comprehensive corporate compliance policies and programs.39
31 See C Parker, "The Emergence of the Australian Compliance Industry: Trends and
Accomplishments" (1999) 27(3) ABLR 178.
32 See Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW); Protection of the Environment
Operations Act 1997 (NSW); Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic). See S Streets,
"Prosecuting Directors and Managers in Australia: A Brave New Response to an Old
Problem?" (1998) 22 MULR693.
33 See C Parker "Evaluating Regulatory Compliance: Best Practice and Standards", (1999) 7(2)
TPLJ 62.
34 See discussion of law below. See also C Parker, "Public Rights in Private Government:
Corporate Compliance with Sexual Harassment Legislation", (1999) 5 AJHR 159.
35 For example, In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A 2d 959 (1996)
(Delaware Court of Chancery).
36 See S Nomura, above n 29 at 47. Kaneko argues that in sexual harassment cases, an
employer's failure to comply with the statutory duty of care to ensure a workplace free of
sexual harassment is likely to assist the plaintiff in establishing liability against the
employer. See M Kaneko, fire Htanrei de Miru Seku ttara Taisaku [Dealing with Sexual
Harassment: Lessons from the Casesl (1999) at 5-6.
37 R Yamakawa. "We've Only Just Begun: The Law of Sexual Harassment in Japan" (1999)
22(3) Hastings Int l & Comtp L Rev523 at 558.
38 T Uchida, Saiken Kakuron [The Law of Obligations] (1997) at 445.
39 R Yamakawa, above n 37 at 558.
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Social activism
The second path by which social responsibilities are entering the internal management
of companies is via scrutiny of corporate activities by media outlets and activist
groups. Public disclosure of corporate scandals has been especially important in
driving this development. In recent years, the public's attention has been drawn to
scandals on a range of issues: from ethical investments and payments, health and
safety, financial responsibility and the environment; to workers' rights, discrimination.
relations with indigenous communities, and entanglement with corrupt political
regimes.40 Negative publicity has made top managements of targeted companies see
social responsibility as a priority for practical reasons of public relations and brand
image, even if liability is not technically a legal issue.
Corporate Japan has been especially susceptible to this trend. In the post-bubble
recession which has gripped the Japanese economy for most of the 1990s, a series of
corporate failures and banking scandals have severely tarnished the image of many
Japanese businesses, both domestically and internationally. The financial sector's
inability to contain bad debt, culminating in the collapse in November 1997 of Japan's
tenth largest bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and fourth largest broking firm,
Yamaichi Securities Corporation, led to a widespread loss of confidence in the Japanese
financial system. 42 Multi-billion dollar bailouts of financial institutions, such as Cosmo
and Kizu Credit Unions and Hy6go Bank, and a string of insolvencies involving major
corporations fuelled further public outcry.43 Reports of corporate excesses quickly
filled the pages of newspapers: corporations expending lavish sums 'entertaining'
public officials; securities brokers unlawfully covering the financial losses of their
clients; company directors paying the mafia (sokaiya) to control annual general
meetings of shareholders.4 4 With Japan still struggling to escape its longest recession
since the war, corporations are looking to embrace 'compliance' programs 5 to restore
the public's faith in their businesses. 46
Outside of Japan, chemical companies and mining companies often bear the brunt
of negative media attention. Consider, for example, BHP and Ok Tedi, Shell in Nigeria
40 For example, in the case of Japan. see Risuku Difensu Kenkyfikai IThe Risk Defence
Research Committee], Fairu: Kigys Sekinin Jiken Vol 1 [A Fle on Corporate Responsibility
Scandals (Volume One)] (1995); Risuku Difensu Kenkyakai [The Risk Defence Research
Committee], Fairu: Kigy Sekinin Jiken Vol 2 [A File on Corporate Responsibility Scandals
(Volume Two)] (1997).
41 Y Miwa, above n 9 at 1252-3.
42 N Kishi. "Is MOF to Blame for Japan's Second Defeat?" (1998) 25(5) Japan Echo 47 at 48-49.
43 D H Whittaker and Y Kurosawa, above n 28 at 764.
44 S Nomura, above n 29 at 45.
45 There is some early evidence of Japanese corporations successfully restoring their corporate
image by implementing compliance management plans. Toshiba Corporation, for example,
implemented a compliance system to monitor its exports after it was exposed illegally
exporting nuclear-capable technology to the (then) USSR contrary to export restrictions set
by COCOM (the Coordinating Committee for Export Control): ibid at 44. For background
on the Toshiba scandal, see J D Hobbs, "Treachery by Any Other Name: A Case Study of
the Toshiba Public Relations Crisis" (1995) 8(3) Management Communication Quarterly 323;
W C Triplett, III, "Crimes against the Alliance: The Toshiba-Kongsberg Export Violations"
(1988) 44 PolicyReview8.
46 S Nomura, above n 29 at 45.
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and the North Sea, Esso (Exxon) at Longford. But a number of companies are also
coming under scrutiny on human rights issues, most notably clothing companies such
as Nike, Levis and Disney for using local sweatshop labor or overseas under-age and
under-paid labour. The result of this trend is that, globally, a number of very large
companies are joining voluntary initiatives or hiring consultants with the aim of
pursuing or appearing to pursue a 'triple bottom line' financial sustainability, social
sustainability and environmental sustainability. For example, the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development which explicitly embraces the 'triple bottom line'
approach includes members such as Australian mining companies BlIP and WMC and
international giants Dow, DuPont, General Motors, Procter & Gamble, Johnson &
Johnson and Monsanto. After its experience of public outcry and brand value
diminution over its proposed disposal of the Brent Spar in the North Sea, Shell
withdrew from the Global Climate Coalition (a United States-based industry body
dedicated to campaigning against regulatory measures to limit greenhouse gas
emissions) and hired the consultants SustainAbility to help them consult with
stakeholders and build a triple bottom line approach. In Australia companies like BHP
and WMC are competing with each other to produce fuller and better 'triple bottom
line'-type environmental reports that detail environmental and social responsibility
management activities over a variety of areas.
2. 'SETTING UP' A MODEL FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE AUSTRALIAN
CORPORATION
Sexual Harassment and Corporate Compliance in Australia
In corporate Australia, compliance with sexual harassment law seems to be firmly on
management's agenda. The evidence points to larger Australian companies devoting
management attention to preventing sexual harassment, resolving grievances and
disciplining wrongdoers. According to the anecdotal evidence of private lawyers and
regulators, companies are regularly hiring lawyers and consultants to help implement
sexual harassment policies and conduct inhouse training sessions. While in earlier
cases, recipients of unwanted sexual attention and harassment were often forced to
resign, now the person found by an internal corporate discipline system to have
perpetrated an act of sexual harassment is likely to be dismissed. 4 7 Sexual harassment
complaints made against medium or large sized companies are more likely to be either
conciliated successfully by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
(HREOC) or resolved even before a formal complaint to HREOC is lodged. Large
corporations rarely go to court or to tribunal hearings on sexual harassment matters;
47 See for example, C Ronalds, "Sexual Harassment and Unfair Dismissal", unpublished
paper, Sydney (on file with Christine Parker). This opinion is consistent with Parker's 1997
interviews with equal opportunity officers and lawyers responsible for sexual harassment
policies in some of Australia's leading financial institutions. Each institution had dismissed
people for sexual harassment in the last few years. Other respondents to complaints had
voluntarily resigned when a formal investigation was commenced because they knew
dismissal was a likely outcome. See C Parker, "How to Win Hearts and Minds: Corporate
Compliance Policies for Sexual Harassment" (1999) 21(1) Law & Policy2l.
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they now prefer to deal with incidents of harassment internally or to settle with a
payout if the internal grievance system is exhausted. 48
Over the last five or six years, both HREOC and state discrimination agencies, such
as the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board (ADB), have received numerous
requests for assistance from companies wishing to set up anti-discrimination policies.
A majority of the requests concern sexual harassment policies in particular. 49 In
response to the demand, HREOC has published a general sexual harassment code of
practice; it has also prepared a specific guide for educational institutions. 50 The ADB
has published guidelines and sample sexual harassment policies, grievance handling
procedures and staff surveys to help employers prevent harassment and handle
complaints The ADB also offers consultancy arid training services for organisations on
sexual harassment and other aspects of anti-discrimination. 51 Demand is high enough
among Australian corporations to sustain a variety of other publications aimed at
helping corporate legal and equal opportunity advisers set up sexual harassment
policies.52
Some systematic quantitative evidence shows that Australian corporate
managements are seriously addressing sexual harassment and that they are doing
better in this area than in other areas of gender discrimination. An Affirmative Action
Agency (AAA) analysis of corporate equal employment opportunity performance
found that 70 per cent of all organisations reporting to the AAA already had sexual
harassment complaints resolution procedures in place by 1994, and that this had
increased to over 85 per cent by 1996. 53 These companies sexual harassment policies
were not merely confined to formal, document-based disciplinary and grievance
handling procedures Between 1994 and 1996, there was a 25 per cent increase among
organisations in male-dominated and gender-mixed industries self-reporting that they
proactively sought to prevent sexual harassment by providing training to management
and staff. By 1996, 64 per cent of these organisations provided training to staff on
48 See C Ronalds, Affirmative Action and Sex Discrimination: A Handbook on Legal Rights for
Women (1991) at 145-146.
49 M Osborne, Sexual Harassment: A Code of Practice (1996) at 6.
50 Ibid. See also Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Sexual Harassment and Educational
Institutions: A Guide to the Federal Sex Discrimination Act (1996).
51 See the Anti Discrimination Board website at <hittp://www.lawlink.gov.au/adb>; Anti-
Discrimination Board of New South Wales, "Sexual Harassment: Why You Need to Prevent
It", Equal Time 27 August 1998 at 6-7 and 9.
52 Other materials include the CC[- looseleaf publication, Australian and New /ealand Equal
Opportunity Law and Practice which contains a whole section on compliance policies and
programs, and E Moston, Sexual Harassment An Employer's Guide to Cases, Consequences and
Remedies (1997).
5 Affirmative Action Agency, Private Sector Facts and Figures (1997) at 19 and 30-33. All
organisations with over 100 employees are required to report to the AAA on what steps
they have taken to implement EEO in their organisation. By 1992 the AAA had already
been successful in getting 95 per cent of organisations required to submit a report:
Affirmative Action Agency, Quality and Commitment: The Next Steps The final Report of the
Effectiveness Review of the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity for Womep) Act
1986 (1992) at 1.
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sexual harassment, and 70 per cent provided training to management aimed at
preventing harassment and learning to handle grievances. 54
A HREOC-sponsored study of gender discrimination in the finance industry (one of
the major employers of women in Australia) provides further evidence that although
gender discrimination is still rife in that industry, corporate managements have shown
some sustained commitment to eliminating sexual harassment. 55 The affirmative
action reports of the top 75 Australian financial institutions showed that their
performance on personnel policies relating to conditions of service was strongest in
relation to sexual harassment. Eighty-seven percent self-reported that management
actively promoted a work environment free of harassment and 81 per cent reported
that formal procedures were in place to deal with complaints of sexual harassment in
their firms. These results were two of the three strongest recorded out of 19
performance areas of affirmative action in conditions of service.56 The study also
showed that paper policies have translated into some real change in corporate culture
as judged by women employees.57 An attitudinal questionnaire found that only 26 per
cent of women employees in three major banks thought that "sexual harassment occurs
at pre-executive and executive level" in their firm, while 71 per cent agreed that
"managers promote an harassment free workplace". This compared with much higher
perceptions of more general sex discrimination problems: 58 per cent of women
believed that "affirmative action is needed in this company, because there is still some
discrimination against women"; and 41 per cent of women thought that sexual
discrimination occurred at pre-executive and executive level in their firms. 58
While HREOC's finance industry study found that women's career opportunities
were still limited by "glass ceilings and sticky floors",59 the relatively positive findings
on sexual harassment show there is some movement by corporate management
towards adopting anti-discrimination norms in at least this one area. We would not
like to conclude from this evidence that all large Australian companies have excellent
sexual harassment prevention and remedial systems. In fact, we are sure that all
companies need to improve and that most companies outside of the services industries
(such as manufacturing and mining) probably still have a long way to go. But neither
should we ignore the voice of those women employees in the finance industry who
believe their companies have already greatly improved in this area. In the following
section of this article, we suspend disbelief for long enough to examine the conditions
that have lead to these modest successes and try to determine whether we canl draw
any conclusions about whether or not---and, if so, when--corporate governance of
54 Affirmative Action Agency, Private Sector Facts andFigures (1997) at 19, 30-33.
55 L Still, Glass Floors and Sticky Ceilings: Barriers to the Careers of Women in the Australian
Finance Industry (1997).
56 Ibid at 29.
57 Other quantitative evidence from the US evaluating the effects of perceived management
attention to sexual harassment on actual incidents of harassment is also clear that more
sexual harassment occurs in organisations in which management tolerates it, than in
organisations where management is perceived to have made good faith efforts to stop it
and provide good role models: C Hulin, L Fitzgerald and F Drasgow, "Organizational
Influences on Sexual Harassment" in M Stockdale (ed), Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
Perspectives, Frontiers and Response Strategies (1996) 127.
58 1 Still, above n 55 at 41-42 and 44.
59 Ibid.
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human rights more generally might be possible. We will then use the experience of
sexual harassment in Japan to examine possible pitfalls and dangers of a 'corporate
governance' approach to human rights.
Towards successful corporate governance of sexual harassment
No company will spontaneously develop an effective internal governance system for
sexual harassment (or, indeed, any other human right.). Rather it will only do so in
response to both external and internal pressures. To ensure a high quality governance
system, external ideas and values about human rights not just internal business
concerns-must influence corporate management. Therefore, any model for the
corporate governance of sexual harassment must explain how external values
enshrined in human rights can interact with and impact on day-to-day internal
corporate management. In other words, it must be a model for how the social
movement politics of human rights can permeate the corporate managerial politics of
profit and infiltrate human resources decision-making. It must also account for how
conciliatory or disciplinary internal grievance handling systems can articulate with
legal rights in formal courts and anti-discrimination tribunals.
The orthodox means that governments have used to make corporations socially
responsible over the last century is 'command and control' regulation-regulation in
which standards, backed by criminal sanctions, are imposed on companies. 60 Since the
early 1980s, scholars and policy analysts have criticised command and control
regulation from two main perspectives: (1) an econonic analysis that sees the costs of
assessing, understanding and complying with command and control regulation as
unacceptably high; and (2) a socio-political analysis of the ineffectiveness of nmuch
command and control regulation to produce compliance with regulatory objectives.
The experience of command and control shows that it is neither reasonable, practical
nor effective for external legislatures and regulators to be solely responsible for
determining how organisations should manage social issues.6 1 The design and
enforcement of regulation to govern every potential social dilemma facing business is
simply riot achievable. Arid even if it were achievable, it would not make businesses
better citizens, since citizenship implies an internal capacity to respond with integrity
to external values.62
John Braithwaite's policy-oriented criminology offers a springboard from which to
develop an alternative model. As the leading empirical and theoretical account of
corporate accountability, his body of work analyses how scrutiny by regulators and
public interest groups-combined with tie background threat of 'big stick' legal
sanctions and negative publicity-can maximise the potential for corporate self-
regulation.6 3 For example, Ayres and Braithwaite's theory of responsive regulation
60 See A Ogus, Regulation: LegalForm and Economic Theory, (1994) at 5.
61 See R Baldwin, "Regulation After 'Command and Control" in K Hawkins (ed). Human Face
of Law, (1997) at 65; E Bardach and R Kagan, Going by the Book., The Problem of Regulatory
Unreasonableness (1982).
62 See P Selznick, above n 8 at 345. See also J Sigler arid J Murphy, Interactive Corporate
Compliance: An Alternative to Regulatoiy Compulsion, (1988); C Stone, Where the Law Ends: The
Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (1975).
63 1 Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992). For empirical demonstrations of the
theory see J Braithwaite and T Makkai, "Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate
Deterrence" (1991) 25 Law & Soc'y Rev 7; J Braithwaite and T Makkai, "Trust and
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suggests that, in general, it is better to maximise the possibility for regulatees to
comply with regulatory objectives voluntarily rather than to constantly rely on heavy
sanctions or coercive regulatory regimes. They find empirically that when regulators
use strategies of "dialogue, communal judgment, reciprocal wooing, and persuasion,
which is minimally coerced by power relations", they can negotiate more constructive
regulatory outcomes.64 By contrast, when regulators use coercive strategies, they often
break down the goodwill and motivation of actors who might otherwise have been
responsive. However, they also find that persuasive and self-regulatory regulation is
more likely to be effective when backed up by tie possibility of more severe sanctions:
regulatees, then, will know there is a certainty of punishment if they defect and that
other regulatees will not get away with breaking the rules. Based on the same
empirical and normative conclusions, Fisse and Braithwaite propose targeting
punishment to mobilise those who can change corporate cultures to do so, and then
giving self-regulation a chance.65 Ayres and Braithwaite argue that regulators should
start with persuasive or restorative strategies and then move to more punitive
strategies if voluntary compliance fails. Thus, if the regulator succeeds in bringing
about compliance by applying punitive sanctions, then it can respond by reverting to a
trusting demeanour rather than building resistance by being overly punitive. If the
initial round of punitive sanctions does not bring about compliance, then the regulator
can respond by invoking harsher sanctions. The wider the range of strategies (from
dialogic to punitive) available to the regulator, the more successful this type of
responsive, 'tit for tat' enforcement is likely to be. Prioritising self-regulation ensures
more frequent use of cooperative measures, without compromising the accountability
provided by using more punitive measures where necessary.
How may we apply this theory to corporate governance of sexual harassment? The
Ayres and Braithwaite theory suggests that tie policy goal is that companies should be
primarily responsible for educating employees and seeking to change attitudes to
resolve problems of harassment that do occur and to prevent harassment occurring in
the future. But Ayres and Braithwaite also suggest that private adjudication of public
rights can only be effective if public anti-discrimination agencies, courts and public
interest groups have the power and capacity to hold corporate governments
responsible to anti-discrimination standards when corporate compliance fails, as it
inevitably will. Corporate liability for harassment and social movement activism must
propel internal corporate justice systems to address harassment and to do it according
to appropriate standards. Connecting public anti-sex-discrinination standards to
internal corporate sexual harassment policies minimises the risk of subsuming an issue
of sex discrimination to business management concerns alone.
The case of Julianne Ashton's suit against Bankers Trust (BT) for sexual harassment
and its aftermath is a good example of how this might work. Ashton complained of
Compliance" (1994) 4 Policing & Society, 1; P Grabosky and J Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle:
Enlbrernent Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies (1986). See also P Selznick,
above n 8 at 345.
64 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, above n 63 at 97.
65 B Fisse and J Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (1993). Fisse and
Braithwaite demonstrate how regulatory enforcement action should be tailored to catalyse
internal corporate justice systems to define who or which groupings are responsible for
wrongdoing in the organisation and in what degrees and to rectify the wrong and learn
ways to prevent similar wrongdoing in the future.
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sustained harassment on the Sydney Futures Exchange trading room floor where she
began working when she was 20. She took her case to the NSW Equal Opportunity
Tribunal since BT had no sexual harassment policy or grievance handling procedure at
the time.66 Bankers Trust decided to fight the case. Five years later in March 1996, the
hearing started and BT attracted much negative publicity as its lawyers brought
evidence that Ashton had not been discriminated against since filthy language and
sexual banter were a "normal part of going on" in the Futures Exchange; women and
men were equally subject to this environment; all young employees were put through
"forms of embarrassment" as an initiation; and Ashton had implicitly accepted this
conduct by using filthy language herself and not complaining sooner.6 7 The negative
publicity cost the bank dearly in staff morale and lost custom-and, of course, legal
costs-and the bank settled the case on the courtroom steps for an undisclosed sum.
The crisis, however, prompted a commitment to a sexual harassment governance
system that went far beyond compliance with the law. The bank hired one set of
consultants to study the culture of the organisation and another set to conduct
workshops with staff to discover what values and quality of relationships they thought
should be evident in their workplace. Training on harassment commenced, combining
the values developed from the ground up through the staff workshops with
considerations of legal liability. The bank introduced a new sexual harassment
grievance handling process that surpassed what the law required. It gave employees
the option of either utilising an internal complaint mechanism or taking their
complaint to an external and independent ombudsman. The ombudsman could (a)
help complainants work out how to solve the problem themselves within the company;
(b) write a report to company management saying what ought to be done; or (c) advise
the complainants that they should seek external legal remedies. While this process was
expensive, the disaster of the Ashton case forced senior management to calculate the
potential costs and benefits of a sexual harassment program and to decide it was worth
implementing.68 Unfortunately, the crisis was so severe that it seems likely many
employees still lacked trust and confidence in management's attempts to address the
problem immediately after the new system was put in place. It would take several
years of senior management commitment to weeding out sexual harassment and
taking complaints of women like Ashton seriously before employees are likely to credit
an employer with having changed.
66 See Y Preston, "Macho Culture of the Dealing Room Floor Taken for Granted", Age 27
January 1996 at 22; J Curtin, "Sex Banter 'Normal"', Age 26 January 1996 at 17 and 19;
G Haigh, "Taking the Bull by the Horns" Weekend Australian 17-18 August at 53-54.67 J Curtin. ibid at 19. In fact tie evidence from Ashiton's witnesses suggested that as a new 20
year old woman employee, Ashton had been targeted for harassment and lewd requests for
a "head job" or "to bend over". But she had gone on performing her work well despite her
situation, even after her supervisor ignored her complaint and downgraded her work
performance: "BT Traders Targeted Junior Female" Age 25 January 1996 at 17.
68 Interview by Parker with Bankers Trust Vice President for Human Resources, 1997. See
J Scholz, "Enforcement Policy and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing Perspective of
Deterrence Theory" (1997) 60(3) Law & Contemp Probs 253 on the problem of 'bounded
rationality' which means that management often do not consider the benefits of
implementing internal management systems to ensure compliance with legal and social
responsibilities until a disaster brings the potential costs to their attention.
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The Ashton case illustrates that invoking legal sanctions to champion equality
rights outside the workplace might make possible the governance of harassment within
the workplace. Formal legal sanctions invoked on one occasion by one brave woman
can create the conditions in which internal corporate justice will benefit many more
employees on other occasions. 69 The crisis can prompt senior management to put in
place internal procedures so that future complainants know they can have their
grievances dealt with quickly and fairly without having to raise the stakes by going to
law. Management may install an EEO unit and even, as in the Ashton case, appoint an
external private ombudsman. They might conduct training and awareness programs to
change the culture of the institution. Next time a problem occurs, the EEO officer may
be able to use the threat of another IIREOC case and the publicity that goes with it to
sell a yet stronger anti discrimination policy to senior management. This is likely to be
an iterative process. One crisis of harassment is rarely enough to ensure ongoing
commitment to an excellent system. Even building employees' trust to use a system
that looks very good on paper is a long and difficult process. As the current splitting
and sale of the Bankers Trust businesses to other banks also illustrates, gains made one
moment can be overtaken by change the next.
The phases to corporate governance of sexual harassment
Successful corporate governance of sexual harassment, therefore, hinges on the
background threat that victims of harassment can appeal to an effective anti-
discrimination regulator and/or the possibility of negative publicity and social action.
With the threat of potential (formal or informal) regulatory action, corporations can be
motivated to maximise the effectiveness of their self-regulatory measures; and even if
voluntary internal governance systems fail to achieve justice, the regulator can function
as a fallback by deciding unresolved complaints.
In short, a governance model for sexual harassment depends on breaking down the
distinction between private profit-making and public rights by making public equality
rights a matter of private corporate justice systems, and making private corporate
governance a matter of public regulation and accountability.70 Whenever abuse of
power and injustice results from internal corporate handling of sexual harassment
grievances, there should always be the possibility of invoking legal sanctions through
recourse to an anti-discrimination regulator. The regulator can enunciate standards,
grant rights and remedies, and reveal the unlawfulness of a discriminatory practice
with the hope that the ensuing crisis will prompt fairer and more effective self-
governance for the future (and the determination that if it does not, legal and public
accountability will be swift to follow).
This approach recognises that organisations already have some internal systems
and capacities for regulating their own conduct regardless of external regulatory
intervention. 71 The potential for corporate governance of human rights depends on
triggering mechanisms of external accountability to affect internal governance
69 A Marshall, "Closing the Gaps: Plaintiffs in Pivotal Sexual Harassment Cases" (1998) 23(4)
Law & Social Inquiry 761 on how women decided to file formal claims in seminal sexual
harassment cases in the United States.
70 C Parker, "Some Questions about Sex and Justice and Power" (1997) 22 Alternative LJ 122.
71 C Shearing, "A Constitutive Conception of Regulation" in P Grabosky and J Braithwaite
(eds), Business Regulation and Australia's Future (1993) at 67.
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processes. The aim is to use public accountability-through legal responsibility, media
publicity, social movement politics and the willingness of individual victims of
corporate wrongdoing to make their fight public in the law courts or the media to
create crises of corporate consciousness and force internal management to respond to
human rights issues.
There are generally three phases in the managerial process of dealing with
dilemmas raised by any social responsibility issue:72
(1) The commitment to respond;
(2) The acquisition of specialized skills and knowledge;
(3) The institutionalisation of purpose.
Management must appropriately respond through each of these three phases to ensure
effective corporate governance of the issue. Mechanisms of external accountability
must apply at each of these three stages to prompt continued corporate commitment
and ensure appropriate action by management. This does not mean a company should
be subject to legal prosecution every time it does not do the right thing. It does mean,
however, that publicity, social movement politics and legal action that do occur should
guide corporate management to what is appropriate at each step of a corporation's
engagement with sexual harassment. Strict liability alone will provide insufficient
guidance and incentives to ensure effective corporate governance of sexual
harassment. Diagram One illustrates how regulators and law (the bottom level) and
EEO officers, public interest groups, the media and other private actors (the top level)
should each impact on the three phases (middle level) of corporate governance
responses to sexual harassment as an issue.
The commitment to respond
The first phase of an appropriate corporate governance response to sexual harassment
is the commitment to respond by top management. 73 This entails the CEO becoming
sufficiently interested and involved in the issue to make statements about it and to set
aside resources to address it. A crisis whether enveloping the company itself or a
competitor usually prompts corporate commitment to respond to a particular social
7 R Cbaganti and A Phatak, 'Evolution and Role of the Corporate Environmental Affairs
Function" (1983) 5 Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy 183 at 187. Chaganti
and Phatak analyse the evolution of corporate environmental affairs functions in four US
companies according to this model.
73 Evaluative studies of corporate self-regulation repeatedly show that top management
commitment is absolutely essential to effective corporate self-regulation. For example,
D McCaffrey and D Hart, Wall Street Polices Itself How Securities Finns Manage the Legal
lazards of Competitive Pressures (1988) at 174 find that "the differences among firms reflect,
more than any other factor, how strongly top management communicates that complying
with the rules is one of the firm's core critical tasks". From his evaluation of the top 5 coal
mine safety performers, John Braithwaite finds that each of the companies, in different
ways, exhibited "a corporate message that top management perceives cutting corners on
safety to achieve production goals as riot in the interests of the corporation". J Braithwaite,
To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (1985) at 61. The studies also make it
clear that this does not mean that senior executives merely mouth support for compliance,
but that they are actively involved in setting compliance goals and reviewing performance
(see J Braithwaite, Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry (1984); cf M Clinard,
Corporate Ethics and Crime: The Role of Middle Management (1983)).
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issue. Such a crisis is commonly precipitated by external action, such as regulatory
enforcement action, private litigation or a widely reported corporate scandal.
Diagram one:
Corporate governance responses to sexual harassment
Negative Publicity
Public Opinion
Social Movement Politics
Staff Pressure
Values of CEO
Creation of Internal
Constituency
(eg EEO unit)
Professional Networking
Contact with Public Interest
Group, Union etc
Modelling Other
Companies' Policies
Media Attention
Public Interest Group
Scrutiny
Accreditation to Private
Standards
Voluntary Reporting
J6
THE COMMITMENT TO
RESPOND
Enforcement Action
Litigation
ACQUSITION OF
SPECIALISED SKILLS &
KNOWLEDGE
Connection Between
Internal Constituency
and Regulators
Regulatory Back-up for
Internal Staff
INSTITUTIONALISATION
OF PURPOSE IN DAILY
MANAGEMENT
Regulatory Rules /
Standards
Mandatory Reporting
Requirements
Regulatory inspections
Court Action
All this helps explain why large Australian companies have devoted so much
attention to implementing sexual harassment policies in recent years. The statistics
show that people are complaining about sexual harassment to the anti-discrimination
regulators in greater numbers than in other areas of gender discrimination. In 1984-
1985, 14.7 per cent of complaints lodged in the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission (HREOC) under the Conunonwealth's Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (SDA)
were of sexual harassment. By 1989--1990, the figure was almost 38 per cent; by 1,993--
1994, 1994-1995 and 1997-1998, the figures were 50.5 per cent, 46 per cent, and 45 per
cent respectively of the sex discrimination complaints (and a constantly increasing
absolute nutber).74 By 1998-1999, sexual harassment remained the largest single area
74 Sex Discrimination Commissioner, above n 50 at 28.
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of complaint with 32 per cent of the sex discrimination complaints. 75 The sheer
numbers of complaints throughout the 1990s suggest that many companies were
receiving many more internal complaints and that the risk of legal action was (and
remains) high.
In 1997, Parker interviewed twelve officers responsible for sexual harassment and
EEO policies in seven of Australia's largest financial institutions about why their
companies introduced a policy and the nature of their programs.76 Interviewees at four
of the seven companies explicitly stated that the major reason for being serious about
the sexual harassment policy was to resolve grievances internally (or prevent them
occurring) in order to avoid complaints being made to external bodies and the
company being 'tried by media' for harassment. Many explicitly mentioned the Ashton
case. Interviewees at (a differently constituted) four of the seven companies described
particular disasters or potential disasters their company had faced that directly
prompted them to introduce the policy in the first place or to implement a renewed
preventive training program. One was Bankers Trust where there had been no sexual
harassment or EEO policy before the Ashton case. Another bank had also introduced a
program for the first time in response to two complaints that had also taken five years
to settle through HREOC. A different bank had found itself facing a large number of
internal complaints of harassment and discrimination in the early 1990s; it, therefore,
decided to introduce a new more proactive sexual harassment training program and
grievance handling process as part of a general new training system devised in
response to new industrial relations legislation. The fourth company had received a
letter from the AAA saying their affirmative action plan was inadequate. This
prompted management to employ an EEO officer and introduce a sexual harassment
policy.77 A fifth bank had had a sexual harassment policy since 1987, but had been the
unsuccessful defendant in a major court case in 1996 which prompted major rethinking
of the program.
Interviewees at the two remaining financial institutions did not mention the
avoidance of disaster or a particular case as crucial to their decisions. Rather, the
moving force in each company was an American CEO who was strongly committed to
EEO principles. Indeed, the CEOs in these two banks Westpac and AMP were well
known publicly and in the industry for their stance that the pursuit of EEO was
important in allowing their institutions to compete by attracting high quality staff. A
recent survey found that in the year since those two CEOs left, female executives in the
financial services industry believed their organisations' commitment to affirmative
action and diversity had stalled. Eighty-six per cent believed no CEO was leading in
this area any more.78 This change it just a few years illustrates how crucial it is that top
S[bid. Now that Australian Women are becoming more familiar with their rights under the
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), complaints about other matters are becoming more
colnnon.
76 These institutions were chosen from inforation supplied by the Affirmative Action
Agency as the institutions with the leading sexual harassment policies in the finance
industry. See C Parker. above ri 47 at 21-48 for further discussion of the methodology arid
findings of this research.
77 If a company's annual affirmative action report is failed, it is ineligible for federal
government contracts, an issue of sonie importance to this company.
78 N Field, "Finance Sector Lags on Affirmative Action", Australian Financial Review 17
September 1999 at 13.
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management remains committed to effective internal governance of issues such as
discrimination.
This Australian experience contains clues about the mechanisms of external
accountability that prompt corporate commitment to internally respond to sexual
harassment as an issue. On one level, a combination of clear legislative prohibition,
media publicity and feminist action ensures good public knowledge of issues and
rights surrounding sexual harassment. Why do people complain so much more
frequently about sexual harassment than other aspects of gender discrimination? It
seems unlikely that sexual harassment is so much more common than other forms of
sex discrimination. Rather, sexual harassment is a fairly concrete concept that lends
itself to sensational media coverage and also to social action campaigns, both of which
can educate women about their right to an harassment-free workplace. It is also
specifically prohibited under Australian law.79 High media publicity for a particular
case can help: one US study found that women were more likely to spontaneously
label behaviour as sexual harassment after the Thomas-Hill hearings, which received
saturation media coverage, than before.80 In Australia, the divisive and heavily
reported debate over Helen Garner's The First Stone may also have raised awareness of
potential legal liability for sexual harassment and discussion of how problems might
be solved. 81
On another level, the law should provide a clear statement that employers are
responsible for the implementation of preventive sexual harassment policies and
remedial systems-and law and regulatory practice must provide incentives for
employers to do so. A distinctive feature of Australian sexual harassment law and
practice is how potential vicarious liability for acts of sexual harassment under anti-
discrimination legislation interacts with industrial law decisions relating to dismissal
of individual perpetrators, to both encourage and authorise strong corporate policies
against sexual harassment.82 Specifically, Australian discrimination law has imposed a
rudimentary duty on companies to implement a sexual harassment policy through:
(1) the possibility of employers' vicarious or direct liability for sexual harassment that
occurs in the workplace;
(2) industrial law decisions on unfair dismissals that authorise strong policies
allowing for a wide range of disciplinary actions, including dismissal of a
perpetrator; and
79 See E Weeks, J Boles, A Garbin and J Blount, "The Transformation of Sexual Harassment
From a Private Trouble Into a Public Issue" (1986) 56 Sociological Inquiry 432 for an analysis
of how media attention, litigation and agitation by interest groups converged to transform
sexual harassment from a trouble affecting many individual women into a public issue in
the US during the 1970s and 1980s.
80 M jaschik-Herman and A Fisk, "Women's Perceptions and Labelling of Sexual Harassment
in Academia Before and After the Hill-Thomas Hearings" (1995) 33 SexRoles 439.
81 1- Garner, 7he First Stone: Some Questions About Sex and Power (1995). See C Parker, above
n 47.
82 Compare this with the confused position under US law where it is not clear how the
implementation of a sexual harassment policy will affect the legal liability of employers:
D Harmelink, "Employer Sexual Harassment Policies: The Forgotten Key to the Prevention
of Supervisor Hostile Environment Harassment" (1999) 84 lowaL Rev 561.
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(3) the conciliation and educational activities of the anti -discrimination "regulators"
(HREOC and the state anti-discrimination boards and tribunals) in encouraging
workplace sexual harassment policies.
First, Australian sexual harassment law encourages companies to develop sexual
harassment policies to avert the possibility of vicarious or direct corporate liability for
harassment by employees. 83 Under s 106 of the Federal Sex Discrimination Act 1984
(Cth) employers (and other persons) are vicariously liable for unlawful acts of sexual
harassment and other forms of sex discrimination by employees or agents done in
connection with their employment or agency. Liability car only be avoided (under s
106(2)) if the employer establishes that they "took all reasonable steps to prevent the
employee or agent" from doing those acts. The courts have held that this usually
requires proof of an effective harassment or discrimination policy implemented in the
company. Medium or large sized organisational employers will only escape liability if
they can give evidence that they have taken active measures to prevent sexual
harassment by issuing a policy, effectively communicating management disapproval of
such practices, and training staff about their responsibilities. For example, in the case
of Dippert vLuxford,8 4 HREOC stated that:
While there is no legal requirement under the Act that in order to establish a defence
under s 106(2) there must be a sexual harassment policy as such, the existence of such a
policy would go some way toward demonstrating that the second respondent had
perceived the issue as a relevant workplace problem and had taken steps towards
addressing that problem.
Second, the industrial relations courts have confirmed that, under a harassment
policy, employees can legitimately be dismissed for harassing other staff or
customers. 85 Westpac dismissed a perpetrator of harassment who then sued them for
unfair dismissal in the industrial relations court. 86 Westpac won the case, providing a
landmark in industrial relations law that legitimises corporate sexual harassment
disciplinary processes so long as procedural fairness is followed. This case empowered
employers to take internal actions that go beyond "the palliative of conciliation".8 7
Indeed, dismissal of the perpetrator was a more severe remedy than HREOC or a court
could have ordered if the initial sexual harassment complaint had been taken to the
public justice system.
83 Under s 106 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), employers (and other persons) are
vicariously liable for unlawful acts of sexual harassment and other forms of sex
discrimination by employees or agents done in connection with their employment or
agency. Liability can only be avoided (under s 106(2)) if the employer establishes that they
"took all reasonable steps to prevent the employee or agent" from doing those acts. The
State Acts have similar provisions: See Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 53; Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 133; Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic), s 34; Equal
Opportunity Act 1.984 (SA), ss 90 and 91(1); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), ss 160 and
161.
84 (1996) FOC 92-828.
85 Nguyen v Vietnamese Community of Australia (1994) EOC 92-644; Gryn v Civil & Civic Pty Ltd
(1994) EOC 92-581; Chambers vJCUof North QId (1995) 61 IR 145; Thomas v Westpac (1995) 62
IR 28; Andrew & Anor v Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd (1996) EOC 92-807.
86 Thomas v Westpac (1995) 62 IR 28 (also summarised at (1995) EOC 92-742).
87 See J Scutt, "The Privatisation of Justice: Power Differentials, Inequality, and the Palliative
of Counselling and Mediation," (1988) 11 Women's Studies International Forum 503 at 508.
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Third, anti-discrimination "regulators" use the introduction of a policy as a
bargaining chip in the conciliation of complaints. Since conciliations are private and
confidential, publicly available knowledge of how they are conducted is sparse.
Devereux's study of forty HREOC conciliation files 88 suggests that HREOC uses the
background threat of a hearing as leverage to ensure respondents accede to proposed
conciliated settlements, especially in Sex Discrimination Act cases. In employment cases,
Commission staff often encourage settlements that include not only remedies for the
individuals involved but also undertakings to implement EEO or sexual harassment
training programs which might engender wider cultural change within the
organisation.8 9 However, under the current law, the anti-discrimination agencies do
not have any power to enforce a conciliated settlement that includes a requirement to
introduce a sexual harassment policy nor to monitor whether it complies with
standards and guidelines issued.
Acquisition of specialised skills and knowledge
The prompting of a commitment to respond is not enough. The second phase is the
acquisition of specialised skills and knowledge in which the corporation acquires the know-
how and personnel to deal with sexual harassment. This often results in setting up a
specialist EEO unit and employing EEO officers to introduce a Sexual harassment
policy. The research repeatedly shows that an internal constituency-empowered to
put the relevant issue on the agenda and formulate procedures and policies for
ensuring it is dealt with-make a significant difference to corporate implementation of
social responsibility policies.90
Once an internal constituency is in place within the organization, it can bring
external pressures to the attention of management and renew their commitment to the
issue or even prompt action on broader issues. Specialist EEO officers can act as a
conduit of external accountability into the organisation. They carry information, skills
and concerns from external groups (such as regulators, public interest groups, and
communities of professional experts) that can significantly shape the way the sexual
harassment policy is set up.91 For example, Valerie Braithwaite evaluated both
procedural and substantive compliance with the Australian Aftirmative Action Act,
88 See A l)evereux, " tumian Rights by Agreement? A Case Study of the Hunan Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission's Use of Conciliation" (1986) 7 ADRI280.
89 Ibid at 296 and 294. Private communication to Parker by Commission staff suggests that
this is usually HREOC policy. See also M Thornton, "Equivocations of Conciliation: The
Resolution of Discrimination Complaints in Australia" (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 733 at
758 for evidence that this is also the approach taken by the NSW ADB.
90 Studies show that an internal compliance constituency is a crucial lynchpin of effective
corporate self-regulation. See J Rees, Reforming the Workplace: A Study of Self-Regulation it
Occupational Safety (1988) at 92, 98-99 and 108. Evaluation of the Californian branch of the
US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) experiment with the
Cooperative Compliance Program between 1979 and 1984 found that the growth of safety
management professionalism was crucial to compliance with regulatory goals.
D McCaffrey and D Hart, above n 73, concluded from their study of self-regulation in the
US securities industry that the institutionalisation of regulatory occupations within
industry (in this case financial compliance officers) is one of the main conditions in which
self or 'shared' regulation is most likely to be effective so long as the law strengthens the
position of the compliance staff.
91 See C Parker, above n 47.
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which requires companies to develop an equal opportunity policy for women, set
objectives, monitor them and submit a report on their progress. 9 She found a positive
correlation between the degree of professionalism of equal employment opportunity
(EEO) officers-especially their professional networking with other EEO professionals
and with the EEO agency and procedural and substantive compliance with the
requirements of the regulation.9 3 Similarly, in a study of corporate compliance with
United States civil rights laws, Edelman found that the professional practices of
personnel officers were instrumental in spreading 'due process' protections for
employees (in relation to discipline, for example) throughout the industry. Personnel
officers viewed due process compliance as part of their 'professional' function.
Therefore as more and more companies established personnel departments, personnel
officers became a direct channel through which models of implementing employee
rights could enter the organization and functioned as an internal constituency for
elaborating and enforcing employee rights.94
This suggests that regulators and feminist activists should aim to work with
corporate officers responsible for sexual harassment, equipping them with the
necessary skills to effectively govern harassment. Working with these officers creates a
direct link between external human rights and internal corporate governance, because
the EEO officers can often be encouraged to see themselves both as loyal corporate
managers and as members and advocates of external networks concerned with anti-
discrimination. But a specialist unit within an organization, by itself, does not
necessarily lead to the success of a human rights corporate governance program;
success hinges on senior management investing the compliance constituency with
"autonomy and power", "clout" or organisational muscle. 95 To ensure organisational
muscle, internal officers must have regulatory and community group back-up. Thus,
tie interaction between management commitment and external regulatory pressure
can boost the effectiveness of internal officers responsible for a sexual harassment
program.
Institutionalisation ofpurpose
The third phase is the institutonalisation of purpose, in which the policy is made an
integral part of corporate objectives, daily management procedures, reward systems
and corporate culture. The most sophisticated indicator of a successful compliance
program is the extent to which the company has integrated social and legal
92 V Braithwaite, "The Australian Government's Affirmative Action Legislation: Achieving
Social Change through Human Resource Management" (1997) 15(4) Law & Policy 327-354.
Braithwaite also used the reports to measure procedural compliance with the eight steps
required by the legislation and a more substantive measure of compliance via reported
implementation of practices that 'accommodate' women (eg, via career break schemes,
women's networks, provision of child care facilities, affirmative action awareness training)
from the reports and the AWIRS data set.
V Braithwaite, First Steps: Business Reactions to Implementing the Affirmative Action Act,
Report to the Affirmative Action Agency, Australian National University, Canberra, 1992).
94 L Edelman, "Legal Environments and Organisational Governance: The Expansion of Due
Process in the American Workplace" (1990) 95 American Journal of So(iology 1401.
9 J Braithwaite and J Murphy, "Clout and Internal Compliance Systems" (1993) Spring
Corporate Conduct Quarterly 52-53; J Braithwaite. Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical
Industry (1984) at 359; see also D McCaffrey and D Hart, above n 73 at 173.
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responsibilities into operating procedures, everyday decision making and performance
appraisal/reward systems. 96
Where human rights are left to corporate justice systems, rights are likely to be
subverted to management goals and priorities. In one study of officers within ten
United States corporations with responsibility for internal grievance processes,9 7
researchers found that companies introduced internal complaints handling
mechanisms to avoid liability in anti-discrimination law, but that the main objective of
corporate complaints handlers was to resolve complaints, restore good working
relations and avoid legal intervention not to identify and eliminate practices of
discrimination. Complaints were consistently seen as examples of poor management or
personality clashes and were rarely linked to public rights and standards of equal
employment opportunity. They concluded that "internal forums tend to reaffirm the
employer's authority over employees and autonomy from outside intervention. 98
It is not enough to motivate companies to put a formal policy in place if
accountability does not follow through to the details of how the governance of
harassment is accomplished within daily management. Organisational cultures and
structures are so different that evaluation is difficult and perfect recipes impossible to
predict. Yet regulators, courts and public interest groups must oversee the quality of
implementation of sexual harassment governance programs by providing guidelines
and best practice examples and by evaluating the quality of programs when
complaints are made to external bodies or when grievances cannot be resolved
adequately internally. Australian courts and tribunals are already showing a
willingness to make decisions about the quality of effective sexual harassment policies.
They certainly should not be satisfied with evidence that there was a paper policy, but
should examine both the terms of any policy and whether it was effectively
implemented in deciding whether reasonable precautions have been taken. In the 1997
decision of Hopper vMIM,9 for example, the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Tribunal
examined the implementation of MIM's anti-discrimination policies in some detail in
order to decide whether MIM was vicariously liable for harassment and discrimination
against Ms Hopper by her colleagues (underground mining engineer apprentices) and
immediate supervisor. The Tribunal criticised a number of aspects of MIM's anti
discrimination policy as inadequate management of the problem. Supervisors were
trained in their responsibilities to detect and prevent sexual harassment, but were not
told that their responsibilities included training employees on sexual harassment.
Supervisors were told that posters of semi-clad men and women had to be removed,
but there was no evidence that anybody ever checked that they were removed. The
Court was particularly critical of MIM for failing to monitor the high attrition rate of
96 For example John Braithwaite's study of the companies with tile best mine safety records
found that important factors of success were developing programs for safety training and
performance, clearly defining safety performance requirements for line managers and
holding them accountable for their performance. J Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade:
Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (1985). Haines identifies a 'harmonising management
philosophy that is oriented towards putting safety and business together. F Haines,
Corporate Regulation: Beyond 'Punish or Persuade' (1997).
97 L Edelman, H Erlanger and J Lande, "Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of
Civil Rights in the Workplace" (1993) 27 Law & Soc yfRev497.
98 Ibid at 530.
99 (1997) EOC 92, 92-879.
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female apprentices recruited to the mine or to follow up the reasons for it. Courts and
tribunals in sexual harassment cases will need evidence on two issues in order to
evaluate compliance systems where a breach is before them: first, they should look at
whether there is a substantial and actively implemented program; second, they should
look at whether it has been effectively implemented with particular emphasis on
whether training has reached everybody it needs to reach and includes monitoring,
and on self-evaluation to gauge whether the system is achieving its objectives.
Australian anti-discrimination regulators are making an effort to provide
guidelines, best practice examples and consultancy services to companies to ensure
that the sexual harassment and EEO policies they implement are of a sufficiently high
standard. For example, the NSW ADB has made a point of trying to protect the rights
of victims of harassment within corporate justice systems by stating that informal
grievance resolution procedures normally will not be adequate and organizations must
provide formal grievance procedures. A further step might be to provide some
incentive for companies to introduce high quality harassment programs by providing
some sort of accreditation and by taking into account the level of accreditation received
when decisions are made about penalties and at what level to pursue complaints.
To make this approach effective, the anti-discrimination regulators should be given
greater and more proactive powers to pursue companies that fail to prevent and deal
with harassment adequately. At the moment, the actions available to a complainant
and to the anti-discrimination boards are not sufficient to provide an appropriate
gradation of sanctions for regulators to be "responsive" to different levels of corporate
governance achievement by companies. The Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner
has stated that HREOC's Code of Practice can be taken into account by HREOC when
making its determinations in public hearings.' 00 It seems clear that it will also be used
in conciliations. However, courts and tribunals will find it difficult to use corporate
sexual harassment policies or model codes much more proactively than they already
do without legislative change. There is little scope for a tribunal to hold that the
adoption of a model code or development of a corporate policy will reduce damages
since the Commission and the courts only have power to order compensatory
damages; 10 there is no punitive or exemplary component to the damages awarded as
there is, for example, under trade practices legislation, where a company's bona fide
adoption of a compliance program can reduce the penalty paid.10 2
Private actors can also make internal corporate governance systems accountable to
external standards when companies hire consultants, auditors and ombuds officers to
help them implement effective systems. Employees, union representatives and local
community representatives may also have an opportunity to input their personal or
social values through direct involvement in the program and consultative bodies.
Indeed, the involvement of affected communities and stakeholders can also improve
the quality of the program. For example, Valerie Braithwaite found that women
100 M Osborne, above n 49 at 7.
101 The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 81(l)(b)(iv) expressly uses the word
"compensation". See also Hall v Sheiban (1989) EOC 92-250 where it was held that damages
under the legislation are remedial and not punitive. See also C Ronalds, above n 48 at 213.
102 Trade Practices Commission v CSR (1991) ATPR 41-076; Trade Practices Commission v TNT
(1995) ATPR 41-375. See B Fisse, "Corporate Compliance Programmes: The Trade Practices
Act and Beyond" (1989) 17 ABLR 356.
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employees were rarely included in consultation about EEO polices under the
Affirmative Action legislation, but when they were the program was likely to be
better. 103
3. 'TESTING' THE MODEL FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF HU-
MAN RIGHTS: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE CORPORATION
IN JAPAN
Why Japan?
The message from Australia's experience with corporate regulation over sexual
harassment is largely positive-that there is real potential for the corporate governance
of human rights, The key to unlocking the potential for successful corporate
governance of human rights, according to the Australian evidence, is to ensure the
convergence of external and internal values at each stage of the corporation's response
to the issue. Each step-whether (1) commitment to respond, (2) acquisition of
specialised skills and knowledge, or (3) institutionalisation of purpose-is a critical
point at which external standards of public rights must interact with internal corporate
processes. The Australian case study shows how external values can impact on internal
corporate workings through the agency of regulators, public interest groups, the media
and, most significantly in many instances, internal employee constituencies that also
advocate those values. Indeed, the Australian data we have reported emphasise a
permeability between the 'internal' and 'external' under which:
(1) employees are empowered within corporate structures by the ability to
strategically move from internal to external remedies;
(2) courts and tribunals, anti-discrimination regulators, public interest groups and the
media devote attention to the existence and quality of corporate governance of
sexual harassment; and
(3) an internal constituency of EEO officers use appeals to public values and business
goals to change the corporation from within.
But is there a flipside to this message of promise? Are there not pitfalls that
underlie the potential problems that attach to the possibilities? In this section, we shift
our gaze to the case of Japan to highlight some of the risks involved in entrusting
corporate responsibility to issues of human rights.
The choice of Japan as a counter-balancing case study is deliberate. Japan's recent
move to a system of corporate governance of sexual iarassment10 4 raises a perfect
opportunity to test our model of corporate accountability for sexual harassment.
Indeed, on one level, by applying the model we have developed in light of Australian
experience to the Japanese context, we can chart -----albeit tentatively -----the course
corporate governance of sexual harassment might initially take in Japan and predict
103 V Braithwaite, above n 92.
104 In April 1997, amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act took effect,
including the new section 21 which requires companies to ensure a workplace free of
sexual harassment. Koyo no Bunya ni okeru Danjo no Kinto na Kikai oyobi Taigu no
Kakuho to ni kansuru llOritsu JAn Act to Promote the Welfare of Female Workers by
Providing for Equality of Opprotunity and Treatment in Employment for Womeni, Law
No 45 of 1985.
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some of the early challenges Japan will need to overcome. On a deeper level, by testing
the model against the situation in Japan, we can gain some broader insights into the
true scope of the model, especially some of the in-built limitations. In short, using
Japan as case study allows us to test both the predictive as well as the explanatory
capabilities of our model.
In these two ways, Japan's recent experiment with corporatising management of
sexual harassment complaints offers invaluable insights. This is important to stress.
The purpose of using Japan as a case study is not to stereotype Japanese law and
society, but to derive lessons about the potential for entrusting corporate governments
with responsibilities over human rights, even if these lessons expose shortcomings or
limitations Therefore, it is not a simple exercise in legal orientalism 105 to surmise that
Japan's recent efforts--precisely because they are so recent--will reveal shortcomings
to relegating regulation authority over sexual harassment to corporate governments.
Since Japan's law on sexual harassment has "only just begun" ,l6 the nascent state of
legal developments and relatively recent public awareness about sexual harassment is
likely to mean that external pressures will be less influential in directing internal
corporate processes.
At the same time, including Japan as a case study is not to make facile and,
ultimately, meaningless comparisons with Australia. This article, we reiterate, is not an
exercise in traditional comparative law. To do so would merely result in highlighting
differences between two legal regimes on sexual harassment that are at different stages
of development and proceeding on different trajectories. Even if it is possible to
surmise that Australia is in a 'superior' state of development compared to Japan,107 this
conclusion carries no significance. Japanese law, after all, is not frozen in time--indeed,
especially in the case of sexual harassment, 10 8 it is in a constant state of development
and change. 109 Further, the conclusion assumes that there is one true path along which
the law must travel to achieve effective legal regulation of sexual harassment-and
that Australia's is more advanced along that route. This is not the case. Indeed,
Wetherfield110 and Yamakawa correctly note that Japanese sexual harassment law
105 E W Said, Orientalism (1978). See also B S Turner, Orientalism, Postinodernism and Globalism
(1994). For a discussion of legal orientalism it) the growth of the 'Asian law' as the new
comparative law, see V Taylor, "Beyond Legal Orientalism in V Taylor (ed), Asian Laws
through Austallan Eyes (1997) 47.106 R Yarnakawa, above n 37.
107 Many Japanese academics have argued that Japanese law on sexual harassment is 10 to 15
years behind that of the United States. See J Ueda, "Sekushuaru Harasumento-Shiyosha o
Meguru Horitsuron o Chushin toshite (16)" ["Sexual Harassment Employers' Liability
(Part 1)"] (1994) 1047 Jurisuto 52 at 55; T Akimoto, "Amerika ni Miru Sekushuaru
Harasumento" ["Sexual Harassment in the United States"I (1989) 1228 Rodo H5ritsu Junp5
22; M Kaneko "Sekushuaru Harasumento to wa Nanika" "What is Sexual Harassment?"I
(1989) 1228 Rod, IloritsuJunp6 4 at 5.
108 M Fukushima, "Sekushuaru Harasumento to Ho" [Sexual Harassment and the Law] (1989)
1228 Rodo toritsuJunpo 16.
109 See R Yamakawa, above n 37.
110 Wetherfield makes the distinction between Japanese and American legal constructions of
sexual harassment by using the Japanese words 'sekushuaru harasumento' to describe the
Japanese case and the English words 'sexual harassment' for the American case. A
Wetherfield, "Amerikajin Bengoshi no Mita Nihon no Sekushuaru Harasumento 06)" [A
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has unfolded along different lines and taken a distinctive shape compared to that in
the West. But more importantly, an explicit comparison of Australian and Japanese law
and practice on sexual harassment fails to advance our working model of the
successful corporate governance of sexual harassment. We do not propose to
impoverish our legal analysis by merely polarising the distinction between East and
West.112 Our approach, by contrast, is to unite, not divide 13  to incorporate the
Japanese experience with sexual harassment as part of an effort to learn more about
effective corporate governance of sexual harassment specifically and human rights
generally.
So is there a key lesson from Japan on the pitfalls to assigning responsibility over
sexual harassment to corporations? The lesson, we submit, is a simple one. The
evidence from Japan is that the prospects for achieving corporate governance of a
human rights is less likely to be promising when external' factors-such as public
understanding of the right and the state of the law-remain uncertain, incomplete or
tentative.
Sexual harassment and corporate compliance in Japan
The latest statistics from Japan on corporate compliance with sexual harassment law
reveals that Japanese corporations are still languishing in their efforts to proscribe
sexual harassment in their workplaces. However, there have been some modest
improvements over the last decade. In November 1989, when sexual harassment was
still a relatively new topic of public debate, a survey by Asahi Television showed that
78 out of 80 companies had not given much thought to introducing policies on sexual
harassment. u 4 By the late 1990s, little had changed. In 1997, a survey of 2,254
companies and 6,762 employees indicate that only 5.5 per cent of companies had
implemented systems to prevent sexual harassment with another 14.5 per cent
planning to do so in the near future.1 15 In 1999, with the new sexual harassment
provisions in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act taking effect from April, a
survey of 322 corporations revealed 28.1 per cent had established an internal
grievance-handling unit, with a further 23.5 per cent currently preparing to do so.
According to the same survey, however. 80 per cent of companies self-reported that
they had at least taken some steps to respond to the issue of sexual harassment in the
workplace. These steps included incorporating new rules in employees' code of
conduct (55 per cent), amending the internal manual to add information about sexual
Foreign LaWyer Comments on Japanese Sexual Harassment Law (Part 1) 1, 1079 Jurisuto 31
at 31.
111 R Yamakawa, above n 37.
112 M Gibson, "A Centre of Hux: Japan in the Australian Business Press" (1994) 8(2) Continuun:
The Australian Journal of Media and Culture <http://kali.murdoch. edu.au/-cntinuum/
8.2/Gibson.html>.
113 B S Turner, above n 105 at 32.
114 Survey of sexual harassment by Asahi Television, November 1989 (cited in Y Moronaga,
"Sekusharu Harasumento" ["Sexual Harassment"] (1989) 947 Jurisuto 10 at 11).
115 Shokuba in Okeru Sekushuaru Harasumento ni Kansuru Kenkyukai [Research Committee
into Sexual Harassment in the Workplace], "Shokuba in Okeru Sekushuaru Harasumento
ni Kansuru Kenkyakai t4Ikoku" ["Report of Research Committee into Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace"I in Ministry of Labor, Shokuba ni Okeru Sekushuaru Harasumento B5shi
Manuaru [Manual for the Prevention of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace] (1998) at 45-89.
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harassment (34.8 per cent), establishing awareness and training programs (27 per cent),
preparing and distributing information pamphlets (24.2 per cent) and developing an
internal sexual harassment policy (14.6 per cent). 1 6 Larger corporations are leading
the way in dealing with the issue of sexual harassment: 100 per cent of companies with
over 3,000 employees self-reported that they had taken action to combat sexual
harassment, compared to 88.5 per cent for companies with between 1,000 and 2,999
employees and 70.7 per cent for companies with less than 1,000 employees. "17
Results from attitudinal surveys among Japanese working women are even less
auspicious. In 1989, most women believed that Japanese corporations tended to
quickly dismiss allegations of sexual harassment u1 8 and that the only course open to
victims was to resign." 9 A decade later, Japanese women remain wary. An attitudinal
survey of female employees in 7,200 private companies in 1999 reveal that a mere 4.8
per cent of women believed that their employers were taking concrete action to combat
sexual harassment. Although 64.1 per cent of those women who had lodged a
complaint of sexual harassment believed that their complaints were dealt with
effectively and swiftly, a majority of women responded that their companies did not
have adequate sexual harassment training programs (82.4 per cent) nor any internal
grievance handling procedures (82.1 per cent).12
These statistics match informal anecdotal evidence from academics and lawyers. At
a meeting of inhouse lawyers at the Commercial Law Centre (Tokyo) on 10 April 2000,
one participant reported how a company's training session on sexual harassment went
awry when the male employees started laughing during a video presentation. This
reaction, he noted, served to trivialise the problem of sexual harassment, and isolated
the women at the training session. Masaomi Kaneko, a senior official at the Tokyo
Metropolitan Labour and Economics Bureau with research expertise in sexual
harassment law and policy, confirms that confusion still reigns in Japan over what
constitutes sexual harassment and why it is wrong.' 2 ' Mizuho Fukushima, a feminist
lawyer who has handled numerous cases of sexual harassment, believes that this
confusion underlines the lethargic response by Japanese companies to the problem of
sexual harassment. In her experience, corporate Japan still underplays the seriousness
of sexual harassment and is failing to protect the human rights of women workers. 12 2
Applying the lessons from Australia to Japan
Clearly, then, a gap divides Australia and Japan on how successfully corporations in
the two countries are dealing with sexual harassment. The key to explaining this gap
lies in the model for the successful corporate governance of sexual harassment we
116 Rosei Kenkyujo Henshubu [Editorial Staff of the Labour and Politics Research Centre],
"Kaisei Kint 6h ni Kigy6 ha )6 Tai6-shitaka?" ["How Have Corporations Responded to the
Amended Equal Opportunity Act?"] (1999) 3415 RiseiJih6 3 at 6-7.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid,
120 Rodosho Joseikyoku Seisakubu [Policy Section of the Women's Bureau. Ministry of Labor],
"98 Nenndo Josei Koy6 Kanri Kihon Chosa" ["General Survey of Women in Employment
and Management (Fiscal Year 1998)"] (1999) 3415 RoseiJiho 59 al 63.
121 M Kaneko, above n 36 at ii.
122 M Fukushima, Bengoshi ga Oshieru Seku Hara-Konna Told D5 Naru ISexual Harassmenit and
What to Do about It: Advice from a Lawyed (1999) at 2-3.
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developed in light of the Australian data. One of the core tenets of this model is that
'public' values about sex discrimination must infiltrate the 'private' realm of corporate
governance. This, however, assumes that such 'public' values are firmly entrenched in
society and, by corollary, in the legal system. In the Japanese case, this assumption
does not necessarily hold.
Public consciousness about sexual harassment in Japan
For example, public understanding about sexual harassment in Japan is still in a state
of flux. No doubt this is because sexual harassment is a relatively new issue to most
Japanese. Although sexual harassment as a phenomenon has had a long history in Japan,
it was not until the late eighties and early nineties that it emerged as a problem.' 23 Some
Japanese scholars estimate that Japan is about ten to fifteen years behind the United
States in bringing sexual harassment into the public arena. This is why Mizuho
Fukushima, a Japanese attorney, describes sexual harassment in Japan as both a "new
and old problem". 1 25
Sexual harassment was unknown to the Japanese public for so long because it was
hidden under a shroud of ignorance. In fact, until 1989, the Japanese language was ill-
equipped to even express the concept.12 6 A Japanese work for 'sexual harassment
(sekushuaru harasumento, commonly abbreviated to seku hara) did not become part
of commonly accepted language use until 1989.127 Even among academic circles,
sexual harassment was only introduced as an issue of comparative law in 1983 1 -it
was not explored as an issue in Japanese law until the late 1980s.
However, interest in the problem of sexual harassment surged in August 1989
when the first sexual harassment case was filed in the Fukuoka District Court. 129
Newspapers 130  and popular magazines 13 1  carried numerous articles and
commissioned surveys on sexual harassment. Some surveys revealed that as many as
six out of ten working women had been sexually harassed during the course of their
123 Ehara explains the 'problernatisation' process through which sexual harassment in Japan
transformed from a long-standing phenomenon into a recognisable problem. See Y Ehara,
"'Sekushuaru Harasumento no Shakai Mondaika' wa Nani o Shite iru koto ni Naru no ka"
in T Inoue. C ueno and Y Etiara (eds), Sekusbuafiti [Sexualit] (1995) 105.
124 J Ueda, above n 107 at 55; T Akimoto, above n 107 at 22; M Kaneko, above n 107 at 5.
125 M Fukushima, above n 108 at 16.
126 The Japanese language does have the phrase seiteki iyagarase-combining native Japanese
words seiteki (sexual) and iyagarase (bullying) ---as a coinage denoting sexual harassment.
However, some commentators argue that the phrase does not fully convey the seriousness
of sexual harassment, since the word Jyagarase has a lighter connotation of 'pestering' or
'irritating'. See 11 Sogabe, "Sbokuba ni okeru Seiteki Iyagarase no Jittai to Sbonondai"
I"Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Facts and the Issues"], (1990) 41 fiya to Seigi52
at 52.
127 K Kinjo, "Sekushuaru Harasuniento to Danjo Koyo Kikai Kintoho" ["Sexual Harassment
under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act"] (1990) 956 Juisuto 37 at 37.
128 T Akimoto, above n 107 at 22.
129 Y Nakashita eta), Sekushuaru Harasumento I Sexual Harassment] (1987) at i
130 N Patterson. "No More Naki-Neiri? The State of Japanese Sexual Harassment Law:
Judgment of April 16, 1992, Fukuoka Chiho Saibansho, Heisei Gannen (1989) (wa) No 1872,
Songai Baisho Jiken apan)" (1993) 34 Harv Int' 1L J1 206 at 220.
131 Y Nakashita, above n 129 at 7-8.
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working lives. 13 2 Books proliferated: "[I]n 1990 alone some ten separate books on
sexual harassment appeared, including 'guides' for male coworkers that ranged from
sensitisation and consciousness-raising strategies to more basic 'how not to' and 'how
not to get caught' guidebooks."' 33 There was even a prime-time made-for-television
movie in which the female character encounters sexual harassment in the
workplace. 34
Even so, confusion still prevails. As Kaneko writes:135
Ten years have already elapsed since the word sekushuaru harasumento [sexual
harassment], hardly a word which slips off the tongue, entered the Japanese language.
Although difficult to say, the word has firmly infiltrated Japanese society. The word even
became 'trendy', no doubt because it was a word of the times, and I highly doubt whether
there are any Japanese unfamiliar with the word.
But familiarity with the word itself and comprehension of its meaning are two entirely
different matters. Even ten years after sexual harassment was first introduced to Japan,
Japan is still asking itself 'what is sexual harassment?' Many still confess to not knowing.
Recent attitudinal surveys confirm that a mature understanding of sexual harassment
has yet to take firm root in Japan, especially among Japanese men' 136
Japanese sexual harassment law
This nascent state of public awareness about sexual harassment hardly provides a firm
bedrock on which to overlay a strong legal statement about sexual harassment. An
overview of the legal development of Japan's sexual harassment law attests to the fact
that Japan's legal response, although rapidly evolving and maturing is still lacking a
firm voice.
In large part, this is because the law itself is still young. Japan's sexual harassment
law, after all, is barely ten years old. The filing of Japan's first sexual harassment case
in the Fukuoka District Court 137 in August 1989 kick-started legal moves to develop a
sexual harassment doctrine. With saturation media coverage of the case, public interest
in the issue surged. This popular interest spurred feminist lawyers and labour law
specialists to probe the problem of sexual harassment and analyse possible legal
remedies. law journals filled quickly with their analyses; some major legal periodicals
even published special editions dedicated to the theme of sexual harassment. 138 Faced
with no explicit law outlawing sexual harassment, the academics typically argued that
the practice of sexual harassment, as a form of sex discrimination, offends a
fundamental principle in Japanese law of sexual equality. In pursuing this argument,
the academics invariably defined sexual harassment consistently with international
definitions as unwarranted, unsolicited and unreciprocated attention of a sexual
nature, which either is accompanied by employment threats or benefits or creates a
132 Ibid at 17.
133 S Buckley, "A Short History of the Feminist Movement in Japan" in J Gelb and M Lief
Palley (eds), Wonen ofJapan and Korea (1994) 169 at 177.
134 Ibid.
135 M Kaneko, above n 36 at ii (translation by Leon Wolff).
136 A Okuyama, above n 10 at 15-16.
137 Y Nakashita et al, above n 129 at 1.
138 Rde5 ThIritsu Junp6, a leading journal on labour law issues, published a special edition on
sexual harassment in 1989 (issue no 1228); in 1990, .hrisuto, a general law journal, followed
by publishing its own special issue (issue no 956).
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hostile working environment. Since such behaviour is patent discrimination against
women and thereby contravenes the principle underlying the legal system of sexual
equality, Japanese law, they concluded, carries an inherent prohibition against acts of
sexual harassment. 139
The courts have picked up on the academic theories and moulded these into a
judicial doctrine. Judgments have see-sawed-from decisions cautiously recognising
the illegality of sexual harassment; 140 to reactionary responses, such as dismissing the
complainant's suits for evidentiary reasons 4 1 or upholding the defendant's counter-
claims in defamation; 142 and, most recently, back again to an affirmation of the
unlawfulness of sexual harassment. 14 3 However, as a general trend, the courts have
accepted the basic tenor of the scholars' arguments, recognising that acts of sexual
harassment may constitute a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code. This doctrine is
beginning to take firmer shape as the early drizzle of sexual harassment cases turns
into a steadier flow. By 1992, there were only two sexual harassment decisions. At the
end of 1995, over 20 sexual harassment cases were pending before the courts; 14 4 by
1999, 88 cases had resulted in judgment or in-court compromises.1 45
The legislature has since intervened in Japanese sexual harassment law by
introducing amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act requiring
corporations to ensure a workplace free of sexual harassment. When these new
provisions came into effect in April 1999, they brought to a close the first ten years of a
Japanese legal response to sexual harassment.
It is tempting to conclude from this legal history that the relative shortcomings to
Japan's recent experiment in relegating regulatory authority over sexual harassment to
corporations may be precisely because the experiment is so new. But this is not all. Not
only is Japanese sexual harassment law new, but its evolution reveals certain
trademarks which suggest that it will not offer the strong framework necessary to
support an informal system of corporate regulation over sexual harassment. Two
themes are particularly striking. The first is Japan's very cautious and gradual legal
approach to the issue of sexual harassment. 146 The second is the role of law and legal
institutions in diluting the effect of an emerging law against sexual harassment.
The first theme-Japan's cautious attitude to sexual harassment-is most starkly
demonstrated by the initial reluctance of Japanese judges, bureaucrats and legislators
to use the words 'sexual harassment'. The earliest judgments on sexual harassment, for
139 For an overview of the legal development. of a Japanese sexual harassment law doctrine,
see L Wolff, "Eastern Twists on Western Concepts: Equality Jurisprudence and Sexual
Harassment in Japan" (1996) 5 Fac Rim L & Pol'yJ509 at 517-520.
140 For example, Judgment of 16 April 1992, Fukuoka District Court, (1992) 783 Hanrel Taimuzu
60.
141 Judgment of 24 May 1995, Yokohama District Court , (1995) 670 RAdo lanrei 20.
142 Judgment of 11 April 1994, Tokyo District Court (1994) 655 Rad Hanrei 44.
143 Judgment of 29 August 1995. Osaka District Court (1996) 893 H1anrei Tairnuzu 203.
144 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (evening edition) 5 February 1996 at 13.
145 M Kaneko, above n 36 at 191-202.
146 Parkinson discusses the notion of gradualism in Japan's approach to equal opportunity
law. See I. Parkinson, "Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law: An Alternative
Approach to Social Change" (1989) 89 CoIL Rev 604.
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example, make no mention of 'sexual harassment'. 147 The first government report into
the problem does not even carry the words 'sexual harassment' in its title (instead, the
issue is obliquely referred to as a 'communication gap' between men and women).' 4 8
And the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,149 with new provisions coming into
effect in 1999 regulating workplace sexual harassment, neither refers to nor defines
'sexual harassment'. 150
This earlier reticence, however, is slowly breaking down and a legal response to
sexual harassment is beginning to emerge. Judges now are more forthright in their
treatment of sexual harassment, and are beginning to construct a network of civil law
concepts that can support a Japanese doctrine of sexual harassment.15 1 In addition, the
Ministry of Labor is exercising its rule making authority under the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act by progressively developing definitions and standards that it will,
over time, incorporate into regulations. Even so, caution and gradualism are still
evident in the way sexual harassment has been subsumed within broader discourses
on law, thereby stunting its emergence as an issue of legal importance in its own right.
Under Japanese civil law, for example, judges do not ask whether the facts before them
amount to sexual harassment; they mostly employ the language of torts to ascertain
whether the facts constitute 'unlawful acts' for the purposes of Article 709 of the Civil
Code. Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, too, sexual harassment is not a
statutory offence; it is ensconced within a corporation's wider duty to maintain
responsible workplace policies and procedures.
The first theme of gradualism is closely connected to the second theme of erosion.
Not only is Japanese sexual harassment law emerging in guarded, short steps; its
development is being hampered-and its effect partly eroded-by counter-movements
in legal doctrine and ineffectual legal machinery. An example of a doctrinal
development that threatens to undermine sexual harassment law is the new direction
that defamation law is heading in Japan. In sexual harassment suits, courts are now
147 The first judicial statement on sexual harassment was by Judge Akimoto of the Shizuoka
District Court. Since the defendant in that case did not enter a defence, the judge issued a
default judgment upholding the plaintiffs claims. Judgment of 20 December 1990,
Shizuoka District Court, (1991) 745 Hanrei Taimuzu 238. The second sexual harassment
case ---but te first contested case ---was decided by the Fukuoka District Court. Judgment
of 16 April 1992, Fukuoka District Court, (1992) 783 Hanrel Taimuzu 60. Neither judgment
contains the term 'sexual harassment' within its reasoning.
148 A Okuyama (Chair), Report by the Research Coinmittee on the Communication Gap between
Female Employees and Management (Ministry of Labor, October 1993).
149 Koyo no Bunya ni okeru Danjo no Kinto na Kikai oyobi Taigu no Kakuho to ni Kansuru
Haritsu [Act to Promote the Welfare of Female Workers by Providing for Equality of
Opportunity and Treatment in Employment for Women], Law No 45 of 1985.
150 Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Labor under s 21(2) of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, Law No 45 of 1985, contain a definition of sexual harassment, a
classification of sexual harassment into qui pro quo harassment and environmental
harassment, and some illustrative examples. See Notification No 20 of the Ministry of
Labor.
151 See S Yamada, "Shokuba ni okeru Sekushuaru Harasumento o meguru Saibanrei no
Bunseki (1)" ["An Analysis of the Case Law on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (Part
One)"] (1999) 105 THfaku Shimps 41 at 42-83; S Yamada, "Shokuba ni okeru Sekushuaru
Harasumento o meguru Saibanrei no Bunseki (2 Kan)" ["An Analysis of the Case Law on
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (Part Two)"] (1999) 106 Hsgaku Shimpo 87 and 88-146.
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recognising counter-claims in defamation. These counter-claims are brought by
defendants who, in a cross-action, contend that the plaintiffs allegations of sexual
harassment are unsubstantiated and, by communicating them to company
management or in public court documents, unlawfully harm the defendant's
professional and personal reputation. Thus, in one case, the court not only dismissed
the plaintiffs case (on the grounds of lack of evidence), but also awarded damages
against her for defaming the defendant.1 52
In addition, evidence law-or, at least, its application-is also causing difficulties
for female victims of sexual harassment. In some cases, despite very specific evidence
of rape or sexual assault, courts have dismissed claims for damages because of a
stereotypical view of how women should behave when the victim of sexual
violation. 153 Apparently unfamiliar with the characteristics of the psychological
reaction to physical assault known as 'Rape Trauma Syndrome', Japanese courts have
questioned the reliability of testimony when the plaintiff has not cried, run away,
screamed, strongly resisted physical advances or confided in family or friends
immediately after an attack154 Legal infrastructure is also inhibiting, rather than
supporting, legitimate cases of sexual harassment. Low (although rising) 155 damages
awards and weak enforcement mechanisms continue to discourage Japanese women
from bringing legal actions in court.1 56 Further, Japanese women cannot invoke the
quasi-judicial powers of the Equal Opportunity Mediation Commission since the
Commission is currently not vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide sexual
harassment cases. Mediation allows women to negotiate solutions with their
employees without the need to resign their positions and engage in expensive, time-
consuming and risky litigation.
Future challenges for Japan
These social and legal dynamics underpinning Japan's policy response to sexual
harassment, however, are not at a standstill. The gradual approach to law reform by
the courts and the legislature do allow for the realistic prospect of a stronger public
regime eventually emerging in Japan. According to our model, this will widen the
possibility of public values entering--and influencing-Japanese corporate
governments.
152 Judgment of 11 April 1994, Tokyo District Court, (1994) 655 R15d5 Hanrei44.
153 See, for example, Judgment of 24 March 1995, Yokohama District Court, (1995) 670 Rfid
lanrei 20.
154 A Wetherfield, "Amerikajin Bengoshi no Mita Nihon no Sekushuaru Harasumento (Ka)"
["A Foreign Lawyer Comments on Japanese Sexual Harassment Law (Part 2)"], 1080
jurisuto 75 at 79. However, note that recent decisions are upholding the plaintiff s claims,
even if she did not respond to the alleged acts of sexual harassment in a stereotypical
fashion. For example, see Yokohama Sexual Harassment Case (Decision of the Tokyo High
Court, 20 November 1997) 728 Rdb HanreiJihb 12.
155 M Fukushima, above n 122 at 1.
156 See generally N Yamanouchi and S J Cohen, "Understanding the Incidence of Litigation in
Japan: A Structural Analysis" (1991) 26 Int'l Law 443; J 0 Haley, "The Myth of the Reluctant
Litigant", (1978) 4 Journal ofJapanese Studies 359.
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Social movement activism in Japan
Two social actors in Japan will play an important role in steering tie momentum for
change. The first is the media. Sexual harassment has attracted-and continues to
attract-considerable press coverage. 157 The Fukuoka Sexual Harassment case,1 58
Japan's first contested case on sexual harassment, reached the front pages in all of
Japan's major newspapers. 159 The latest criminal trial against the former governor of
Osaka, brought by a 21 year old university student campaign assistant following her
victory in a civil action, continues to make sexual harassment headline news in both
television and the papers.
Our model for the corporate governance of human rights suggests that this ongoing
media scrutiny will ensure that Japanese corporations take their responsibilities for
sexual harassment seriously. In the Julianne Ashton case, the Australian media
certainly was influential in propelling Bankers Trust to rethink their corporate
response to sexual harassment. Patterson, in her analysis of the aftermath to the
Fukuoka Sexual Harassment case, credits the Japanese media for forcing a similar
"flurry of activity" within some Japanese corporations 6 0 However, the role of the
media may be more ambiguous than Patterson suggests. A number of commentators
have noted that the Japanese media tends to pick up sexual harassment stories to
sensationalise the more salacious elements.16 1 With headlines such as "Can't Tell Dirty
Jokes Anymore", "Don't Use Familiar Forms of Address to Your Female Employees,"
and "American Sexual Harassment Cases Reap Million Dollar Damages Verdicts", the
popular press has sensationalised, and thereby trivialised, the problem of sexual
harassment.16 2 The media, many argue, has treated sexual harassment as more a
'trendy' topic of conversation than a real example of gender inequality. 6 3 This dilutes
the impact of ongoing media scrutiny.
The more important social actor for the future of sexual harassment law and policy
in Japan will be the Japanese feminist movement. This view may surprise those expert
on Japanese law. After all, it runs counter to the wider assumption that feminism is
generally an irrelevant social force in Japanese society.' 64 According to this view,
Japanese feminism is merely an American import which has failed to take root in
Japan.' 65 Feminisni, the argument goes, has never established a foothold in Japan as a
vigorous movement "with a mass-roots or strong national presence".16 6 When it has
157 Each January, the feminist journal JoseiJobh collects media articles about sexual harassment
(as well as other issues) which appeared in the press the previous year.
158 Judgment of 16 April 1992, Fukuoka District Court, (1992) 783 Hanrei Tairnuzu 60.
159 J Nakagawa, "Sekushuaru Harasumento" ["Sexual Harassment"], (1992) 45(6) H ritsu no
liroba 54 at 55.
160 N Patterson, above n 130 at 206 and 220-221.
161 Y Ehara, "'Kaiwa Bunseki' kara Mita Sekushuaru Harasumento" ["Sexual Harassment:
Applying a Conversation Analaysis"] (1992) 1426 Ioki no 1orei 2.
162 M Kaneko, above n 107 at 4.
163 Y Ehara, above n 161 at 4.
164 See J Gelb and M Lief Palley, "Introduction" in J Gelb and M Lief Palley (eds), Women of
Japan and Korea: Continuity and Change (1994) 1 at 69 and F Upham, Law and Social Change in
Postwar.Japan (1987) at 144.
165 J Gelb and LiefPalley, above n 164 at 69.
166 F Upham, above n 164 at 144.
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orchestrated public campaigns, its tactics were outlandish and eccentric, rendering it
an object of public ridicule. 16 7 As a result, it is "politically irrelevant".1 68
However, a brief survey of the history of post-war feminism in Japan, as well as an
analysis of contemporary efforts by Japanese feminist groups to fight sexual
harassment, does not lend support to this view. First, Japanese feminism is not a
carbon copy of its American cousin; it developed out of distinct indigenous
conditions.1 69 Accordingly, it is a specifically Japanese phenomenon. Second, the
localized, fragmented structure of Japanese post-war feminism does not mean that
Japanese feninism has failed to extend its influence within Japan. Indeed, the
preference towards community-based groups rather than broad-based, national
organizations17 0 has allowed the feminist voice to find expression in different
communities throughout Japan. The effectiveness of Japanese feminism, therefore, has
been because of, not despite, its decentralized and fractional organization. 7 1 Third,
Japanese feminism, like its counterparts elsewhere, is characterized by diverse interests
and is divided into moderate and militant wings. While some feminist activists have
chosen to adopt highly controversial strategies, their choice of tactics-indeed, the
ideas that they advocate-do not necessarily describe the broader feminist movement.
Therefore, it is unfair to dismiss the Japanese feminist movement as generally
unimportant on the basis of an analysis of just one of its elements. Fourth, and most
recently, the feminist campaign against sexual harassment confirms the significance of
Japanese feminism as a social force. After all, the efforts of feminist groups and
feminist lawyers have secured the issue of sexual harassment a place on the social
agenda.
To date, the Japanese feminist movement has pursued a multi-faceted strategy to
raise awareness about sexual harassment in Japan. Marshalling the resources of law,
mass communication and scholarship, Japanese feminist activists have highlighted
both the pervasive extent of sexual harassment in Japanese society as well as its
iniquitous nature.
Initially, Japanese feminists tackled the problem of sexual harassment through
research, surveys and theorising. Feminists first learnt about sexual harassment from
the pages of existing American research on the problem. Women's groups translated
handbooks on sexual harassment published by American labour unions 172 and
feminist scholars referred to key scholarly works on sexual harassment by, for
example, Lin Farley' 7 3 and Catherine MacKinnon.174 Numerous female legal
academics also studied the United States law on sexual harassment, focusing on both
the doctrinal statements on sexual harassment by the American courts and the
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Chiyo Saito, "Nihonkei no Feminisumu to Agora", (1977) 34 Agora 116, quoted in S Buckley,
"A Short History of the Feminist Movement in Japan" in J Gelb and M Lief Palley (eds),
Women ofjapan and Korea (1994) 157 at 157.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid at 158.
172 M Asakura, "Sekushuaru Harasulnento" ["Sexual Harassment"] 1350 Tkinollarei3 at 4.
173 1 Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job (1978)
174 C MacKinnon, The Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979)
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administrative guidelines on sexual harassment prepared by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. 175
Feminists then approached the task of identifying the nature and extent of the
problem of sexual harassment within Japan. Recognising that Japan's situation may not
necessarily parallel America's due to differences in culture, political institutions, and
social structure, Japanese feminists conducted face-to-face interviews, sponsored
telephone consultation sessions or delivered surveys in order to demonstrate the
pervasive extent of the problem of sexual harassment in Japan. For example, the
Shokuba ni okeru Sekushuaru Harasumento o Kangaeru Nettowaku (The Network oil
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace) interviewed several Tokyo women over a one-
and-a-half month period from late May of 1989 until late August. The Network
collected about 71 second-hand accounts of sexual harassment. Seventy cases involved
women; one involved a man. The findings were formally announced in December 1989
in a pamphlet entitled Sbgen Sekushuaru Harasumento (Testimony on Sexual
Harassment). The pamphlet reported that 23 respondents were approached for a
relationship in their workplace; another 33 were forced into a sexual relationship; and
an additional 14 were raped or otherwise violently assaulted by their bosses or
colleagues. Perpetrators were mostly senior company officials-including company
presidents (42.6 per cent), division mangers (11.5 per cent), section chiefs (19.7 per
cent), and department heads (4.9 per cent).' 76
The Committee for the Equality of the Sexes, a subsection of the lawyers' group
Tokyo Dai-ni Bengoshikai (Tokyo Second Bar Association), sponsored a telethon on
October 7, 1989. Ten telephones were made available for the telephone telethon, and
phone lines were open from 10 am to 4 pin. Calls jammed its telephone lines for [the
full] six hours, and callers lodged 137 formal complaints, forty percent of which were
from women who had been compelled to have sexual relations with their superiors. Six
calls were from men, three of whom were victims of sexual harassment. 1 77 Higashiko
Sogabe, a member of the Bar Association, writes that the number of calls far exceeded
previously sponsored special telephone consulting sessions; the results, she adds,
speaks voluires about the seriousness of the problem in Japan. 178
The women's magazine Nikkei Cman (Nikkei Woman) conducted its own survey, also
in October 1989. Targeting 301 women and 216 men in major regional centres
throughout Japan, the survey was published in the March 1990 edition of the
magazine. According to the results, 56 percent of female respondents replied that they
had experienced some form of sexual harassment in their workplace and 70 per cent of
male respondents confessed that they had witnessed acts of sexual harassment. 179 In
November of 1989, the Hataraku koto to Seisabetsu o Kangaeru Mitama no Kai
(Mitama Association on Working and Sex Discrimination) conducted a significantly
larger-scale survey. With the participation of eleven women's groups, 10,000
175 For example, M Hayashi, "Kasanete, Sekushuaru Harasumento" ["Sexual Harassment Over
and Over Again"] (1991) 1403 Toki no Hcrei 64 at 69-70; K Matsumoto, "Sekushuaru
Harasumento ni taisuru Isharyci Seiky" ["A Civil Suit Claiming Non-Pecuniary Damages
for Sexual Harassment" 1(1991) 985 Jurisuto 122 at 123-124.
176 M Kaneko et al, above n 107 at 16-17.
177 K Kinj6, above ri 127 at 38.
178 H Sogabe, above n 126 at 209.
179 Ibid.
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respondents were surveyed from Hokkaido to Okinawa. After five months of
surveying, the Association received 6,500 responses. The results revealed that 90.5 per
cent of respondents had been groped on their commute to or from work; 60 per cent
had experienced verbal harassment on the basis of their appearance (for example, they
were told they were "ugly"); 70 per cent had been told how useless or unimportant
they were because they were female; and 60 percent had been touched against their
will, shown pornographic pictures, or told lewd jokes or stories. 180
Not content to merely report on the extent of sexual harassment, feminists are also
discussing why sexual harassment is against the public interest. Existing American
research on sexual harassment has provided a springboard for Japanese theorising on
the issue. Mizuho Fukushima, a feminist lawyer, for example, has developed a theory
of a woman's right to sexual self-determination--a right, she argues, which entitles
female plaintiffs of sexual harassment to bring suit against their male aggressors. 18 1
Yumiko Ehara, Associate Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies at Tokyo
Metropolitan University, pursues a sociological analysis of the interaction of normal
sexuality and sexual harassment, arguing that sex-based norms perpetuate sexual
double standards and obscure sexual harassment as an example of gender
inequality.18 2 Women's support groups, such as the Tokyo Lawyers' Association for
Equal Rights and the Committee for Women's Rights and Sexuality, offer
environments for continuing discourse and consultation.
The feminist campaign against sexual harassment transcends mere research and
scholarship. Feminist lawyers have also assisted female victims bring their disputes
before the courts. Yukiko Tsunoda, a feminist lawyer and member of the Tokyo Second
Bar Association, for example, agreed to handle a Shizuoka's woman's complaint of
sexual harassment, securing a 1.1 million yen damages award for her client in the 1990
judgment of the Numazu branch of the Shizuoka District Court. Less than two years
later, she joined a team of nineteen feminist lawyers to litigate (pro bono) a Fukuoka
woman's sexual harassment suit. Similarly, Mizuho Fukushima, another feminist
lawyer and member of the Tokyo Second Bar Association, has actively represented
female clients in sexual harassment disputes. By 1993, she had negotiated settlements
in another twenty cases.1 83
Feminist groups have also exploited the massive media interest in sensationalist
court cases to gain maximum publicity for their fight. For example, feminist lawyer
Mizuho Fukushima ensures the feminist perspective on sexual harassment is
represented in the media by regularly appearing on Japanese television programs on
sexual harassment and attending public seminars on the issue. 184
Japanese feminists have has made important strides in placing sexual harassment
under the spotlight and encouraging debate within the community. Their ongoing
efforts will be critical in ensuring the success of sexual harassment as an issue of
corporate governance. The test for the Japanese feminist movement will be whether or
not it can retain sexual harassment on the public agenda and transform community
180 M. Hayashi, above n 175 at 64.
181 M Fukushima, above n 107.
182 Y Ehara, above n 123.
183 Nihon Keizai Shimbun (evening edition) 5 February 1996 at 13.
184 1, do Rosario, "Petite Lady Lawyer Fights Sex Harassment" (1993) 156(32) Far Easterv
Economic Review 86 at 86.
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attitudes. If they do, our model suggests that this will raise the expectations on how
corporate Japan should regulate sexual harassment and, in addition, spark greater
public criticism should they fail to meet these expectations. This will keep Japanese
corporations committed to not only dealing with complaints of sexual harassment
arising within their four walls, but also complying with (rising) public standards in
resolving them.
Converging the public and private in Japan
The immediate future of corporate governance of sexual harassment in Japan is
complicated by conflicting evidence on Japan's external-that is, social and
legal-response to sexual harassment so far. The social setting to sexual harassment in
Japan is especially complex. Public awareness of sexual harassment is rising, but
confusion about the meaning and parameters of sexual harassment remains
widespread. Intense media coverage of sexual harassment cases should keep public
attention focused on the issue. However, if Japanese journalists and reporters are
simply drawn to the lurid and shocking, public understanding is unlikely to deepen.
Most hope rests on the Japanese feminist movement. If they continue their diversified
campaign to expose instances of sexual harassment in Japan and educate the
community on why it should not be tolerated, Japan will achieve a broader consensus
on anti-sex discrimination values.
Similarly, Japanese law on sexual harassment, although riddled with weaknesses, is
fast growing. As more and more women continue to fight their cases in court, the
judicial doctrine on sexual harassment is gaining greater strength and internal
coherence. Vicarious (and direct) liability on corporations for failing to stamp out
sexual harassment is now established law. Damages awards are rising; and more
verdicts are being handed down in favour of the female plaintiff. The legal community
is actively debating 'kinks' in the judicial doctrine-including the gender bias inherent
in how some courts have evaluated evidence and the effect of the counter-claim in
defamation in deterring legitimate complaints of sexual harassment-and reforms in
these areas are already under way. Nevertheless, Japan lacks a strong background
regulator. The Ministry of Labour is largely limited to issuing administrative guidance
and has no express power to compel recalcitrant corporations to improve their internal
justice systems. The Equal Opportunity Mediation Committee is powerless to hear
complaints of sexual harassment mishandled by corporate management.
Our model for the successful corporate governance of sexual harassment rests on
blurring the distinctions between 'public' and 'private', 'external' and 'internal'. In
short, public values about anti-sex discriniination must permeate the private domain of
corporate governance; and private governance must be the subject of public-social
and legal-oversight. Expressed broadly, the challenge for Japan lies in how to blur
this distinction between the 'public' and 'private' when the 'public' is itself blurred.
More concretely, the challenges for Japan can be summed up in how likely external
norms will converge with internal corporate processes at each of the following three
stages:
(a) The first stage is management's commitment to respond to the issue of sexual
harassment. The evidence in Japan suggests that corporate managements are
beginning to articulate a corporate response to workplace harassment, although
the pickup rate has been gradual and sporadic. The fear of legal liability is an
important motivating factor in this move. However, a murky understanding of
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what sexual harassment is among Japanese men-who dominate top management
positions in Japanese companies-is likely to keep improvements in this area
piecemeal.
(b) The second stage is corporations acquiring specialised skills in managing sexual
harassment. The main inhibitor to this development in Japan is the absence of a
strong regulator--either the Ministry of Labour or the Equal Opportunity
Mediation Committee-to oversee this process. Although the Ministry of Labour
has power under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act to issue guidelines on
sexual harassment, the first set of guidelines issued by the Ministry suggests that it
intends to maintain an incremental approach to social change.1 5 In addition to
explaining some definitional issues, the guidelines require corporations to draft a
corporate sexual harassment policy, distribute it to all employees and educate their
workforce as to its purport. How they should do so is kept vague. Corporations are
also required to set up internal systems to provide counselling services and to
handle complaints of alleged harassment "appropriately and flexibly". 186
(c) The final stage is for corporations to institutionalise a strategy to eradicate sexual
harassment as part of the corporation's mission (and not merely to protect against
potential legal liability or trial by media). Since this stage rests heavily on Japan
travelling successfully through the previous two stages, the immediate prospects
of achieving this stage are particularly dim.
The key lesson from Japan, therefore, is that a nascent, unsettled state of sexual
harassment law--accompanied by a lack of public understanding of the issue-will
mean that external pressures will be less influential in directing internal corporate
processes.
CONCLUSION
The key to the successful corporate governance of a human rights issue is the
convergence of external and internal values at each stage of the corporation's response
to the issue-whether (1) commitment to respond, (2) acquisition of specialised skills
and knowledge, or (3) institutionalisation of purpose (see Diagram One). The
Australian experience emphasizes the significance of permeability between the
'internal' governance and 'external' accountability so that:
(a) employees (and other victims of harassment) are empowered within corporate
structures by the ability to move strategically from internal to external, informal to
formal remedies;
(b) courts and tribunals, anti -discrimination regulators, public interest groups and the
media devote attention to the existence and quality of corporate governance of
sexual harassment; and
(c) an internal constituency of EEO officers uses appeals to public values and business
goals to change the corporation from within.
Diagram One illustrates how regulators and law (the bottom level) and EEO
officers, public interest groups, the media and other private actors (the top level)
185 Notification No 20 of the Ministry of Labor.
186 Ibid.
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should each impact on the three phases (middle level) of corporate governance
responses to sexual harassment as an issue.
The lesson from Japan, by contrast, is that achieving corporate governance of sexual
harassment is less likely to be promising when 'external' factors, especially the state of
the law, remain uncertain, incomplete or tentative. Of course, the corollary is also
true-as sexual harassment law develops greater internal coherence and awareness of
sexual harassment strengthens, corporations are more likely to be more forthright in
their own treatment of the issue.
These observations apply beyond our chosen case study of sexual harassment.
Expressed broadly, the key to entrusting human rights to corporate governments rests
on ensuring that public values interface effectively with private management systems.
This interaction between the public ('external') and the private ('internal') is necessarily
symbiotic. Not only must public standards about human rights infiltrate corporate
governance decision-making and human resources practices, but corporations must
actively receive public standards and embed them in their organisational fabric.
The Australian case study on sexual harassment gives cause for optimism that
corporations may successfully take charge of human rights issues. This, of course, is
provided certain conditions are firmly in place. An effective-and, if necessary,
intrusive-regulator, a high level of public awareness, a strong legal regime, ongoing
media scrutiny and active social movements can not only compel corporations to take
their compliance obligations seriously, but can also play a continuing role in ratcheting
up internal regulatory standards to higher levels of quality. The Japanese case study,
however, reminds us that without these conditions, informal governance may riot
achieve hoped-for results.
One question that arises from our comparative analysis is whether or not
corporations should be entrusted to self-regulate on new or emerging human rights. Our
analysis of the Australian experience with sexual harassment led us not only to
conclude that corporations can successfully self-regulate on issues of human rights, but
also allowed us to explore how this could be achieved. Thus, we argue that the
convergence of public standards and private systems needs to pass through a three-
stage continuum through which (1) management commits to addressing the human
right; (2) the corporation develops internal expertise to tackle the issue; and (3) the
corporation internalises the human right as part of its organisational goals. These
conclusions, however, were mainly possible because sexual harassment has a relatively
clear meaning in Australian society and under Australian law.
However, in Japan, where sexual harassment is still evolving both as a legal issue
and as a social problem, the potential for corporate governance of sexual harassment
rests on further developments in Japanese law and social awareness. This means it is
too early to expect sexual harassment as an issue to travel smoothly through each of
the three stages we have identified. Does it follow, then, that Japan moved too quickly
to legislate in favour of a corporate regulation of sexual harassment? Corporate
governance of sexual harassment in Japan would probably be more successful if the
Ministry of Labour had waited until the judicial doctrine on sexual harassment took
firmer shape--or, better still, if they had moved first to bolster sexual harassment law
itself. Does this imply that states should generally wait until new human rights take
root socially, politically and legally before entrusting their regulation to private
corporations?
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These questions are important. With the categories of human rights in a constant
state of flux, the next debate will be over whether corporations can-and
should-assume responsibilities over new public rights when the courts and the
legislatures are still struggling with their import.
